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I. INTRODUCTION
In discussions of parol evidence, Professor Thayer's cen-
tury-old dictum is oft quoted: "Few things are darker than this,
or fuller of subtle difficulties."' Those who read on in Thayer's
book will find that his purpose was not to shed light on the rule or
to elucidate its difficulties, but to demonstrate that it is not a rule
of evidence.2 By contrast, it is the author's hope that by the end of
this Article, some light will be shed on the much-misunderstood
rule.
A good starting point for an understanding of the parol evi-
dence rule is the case of Sherrodd, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.,
* Professor of Law, University of Montana School of Law. B.A., Williams College, 1968;
J.D., New York University, 1974; LL.M., New York University, 1981. I appreciate the re-
search assistance of David Duke and Karl Rudbach, students at the University of Montana
School of Law.
1. JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 390
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1898).
2. This conclusion is echoed by the editors of MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, who no longer
include the topic in the treatise. Compare MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
(1st ed. 1954) [hereinafter MCCORMICK] with MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE (John W. Strong ed.,
4th ed. 1992). See infra text accompanying notes 18-24.
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Schlekeway Construction Inc., COP Construction Inc., and Safeco
Insurance Co., decided by the Montana Supreme Court (the court)
in 1991.3 The case arose out of an Army construction project in
which COP Construction Inc. (COP) was a subcontractor of the
general contractors Morrison-Knudsen and Schlekeway. When
COP discussed subcontracting earth-moving work with Sherrodd,4
a representative of Morrison-Knudsen told Sherrodd that there
were about 25,000 cubic yards of earth to move. Using that esti-
mate, Sherrodd computed his price for doing the job at $3.90 per
cubic yard and bid a price of $97,500, which COP used in making
its bid. When its bid was accepted, COP accepted Sherrodd's bid.6
Beginning work without a written contract, Sherrodd discov-
ered that there were actually closer to 50,000 cubic yards of earth
to move. Sherrodd complained to COP, which told him that he
would be paid for the additional work and that he must sign a
written agreement to be paid for work performed. The executed
written agreement stated that Sherrodd would move "LS" [lump
sum] of earth and that COP would pay $97,500. When the job was
done, COP paid Sherrodd according to the terms of the written
agreement-$97,500 less a deduction for uncompleted work. Sher-
rodd sued for payment for the additional work as orally promised
by COP. Defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming that
under the parol evidence rule, Sherrodd's evidence of the transac-
tion must be limited to the terms of the written agreement.6
A majority of the court, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Turnage, affirmed the decision of the trial court granting summary
judgment to defendants.7 The opinion strongly endorsed the view
that commercial stability requires strict adherence to the express
terms of written agreements-a policy that the court found stated
in the parol evidence rule:
The parol evidence rule is the public policy of Montana and
it is clearly established by statute and the decisions of this Court.
If this public policy and rule is not upheld, contracting parties
that include lawful provisions in written contracts would be under
a cloud of uncertainty as to whether or not their written contracts
3. 249 Mont. 282, 815 P.2d 1135 (1991).
4. Sherrodd, Inc. is a family corporation. In this discussion, "Sherrodd" is used inter-
changeably to stand for the corporation and the individual, William Sherrodd.
5. Sherrodd, 249 Mont. at 283-84, 815 P.2d at 1135-36. Although disputed by defend-
ants, these facts are stated as true, because in the procedural posture of summary judgment,
the trial court decided the motion on the basis of the facts as alleged by the plaintiff. Id. at
285, 815 P.2d at 1136.
6. Id. at 284-85, 815 P.2d at 1136.
7. Id. at 286, 815 P.2d at 1137.
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may be relied upon. The public policy and law does not permit
such uncertainty to occur.8
The opinion also addressed Sherrodd's claim that defendants' mis-
representation had fraudulently induced him to enter into the
agreement. The court pointed out that the written agreement be-
tween COP and Sherrodd stated that "Sherrodd has, 'by examina-
tion, satisfied himself as to the.., character, quantity and kind of
materials to be encountered.' '' Because that evidence directly
contradicted this express term of the agreement, the court refused
to allow Sherrodd's evidence on the issue of fraud.10
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Trieweiler argued for reversal
and remand for a trial by jury. According to this opinion, the evi-
dence should have been admitted under the fraud exception to the
parol evidence rule. The fraud exception, Trieweiler argued, should
not be so narrowly applied as to eliminate evidence merely because
that evidence contradicted the terms of the agreement. The opin-
ion also expressed the view that the majority's limitation of the
fraud exception allowed the defendants to perpetrate a fraud. In
circumstances where a party has little choice but to sign the agree-
ment, that party should be protected from overreaching by the
other party.1
This Article explores the parol evidence rule and the fraud ex-
ception, using Sherrodd as a paradigm. Examination of Montana
case law reveals a great deal of misunderstanding of the rule with
resultant misapplication of it."2 Part II examines the rule in the
context of its historical background. Part III examines the problem
the rule is designed to solve-finding the agreement of the parties.
Part IV is a necessary diversion into areas where the parol evi-
dence rule does not apply. Under the suggested approach to recog-
nizing and resolving parol evidence questions, an attorney or court
would first ask:
" What evidence are you offering?
" For what purpose are you offering it?
The answers to these questions will narrow the inquiry by elimi-
nating many situations in which the rule does not apply.
Part V examines the proper application of the rule. After an
8. Id.
9. Id. at 285, 815 P.2d at 1137.
10. Id. at 285-86, 815 P.2d at 1136-37.
11. Id. at 286-89, 815 P.2d at 1138-39.
12. The fact that Montana statutes and cases provide a focus for this Article should
not suggest that the analysis and conclusions are confined to the borders of Montana. The
inquiry into parol evidence and the attempt to find a rubric for its application are universal.
1994]
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attorney or court has determined that the rule does apply, the fol-
lowing questions should be asked:
" Was the oral agreement made?
* Was the oral agreement part of the parties' entire agreement?
Part VI examines the fraud exception, suggesting an approach
courts should take when a party alleges fraud. Under this ap-
proach, more agreements that were actually made would be
honored, and more fraud would be prevented. The price courts
would be asked to pay for preventing fraud is less efficient deci-
sion-making, for evidence would have to be heard rather than sum-
marily excluded.
Let us begin with an examination of the rule itself.
II. THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE STATED
A statement of the rule is found in section 28-2-905 of the
Montana Code:
When extrinsic evidence concerning a written agree-
ment may be considered. (1) Whenever the terms of an agree-
ment have been reduced to writing by the parties, it is to be con-
sidered as containing all those terms. Therefore, there can be
between the parties and their representatives or successors in in-
terest no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the
contents of the writing except in the following cases:
(a) when a mistake or imperfection of the writing is put in
issue by the pleadings;
(b) when the validity of the agreement is the fact in dispute.
(2) This section does not exclude other evidence of the cir-
cumstances under which the agreement was made or to which it
relates, as described in 1-4-102, or other evidence to explain an
extrinsic ambiguity or to establish illegality or fraud.
(3) The term "agreement", for the purposes of this section,
includes deeds and wills as well as contracts between parties."s
To call the substance of this statute the "parol evidence rule"
inappropriately describes its contents: The rule does not concern
only evidence that is parol, it is not a rule of evidence, and it is not
even a rule. Let us explore these propositions.
First, the rule does not concern only evidence that is parol.
13. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-905 (1993). The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) also
contains expressions of the rule. See U.C.C. §§ 2-202 (sale of goods), 2A-202 (leases of
goods) (1993). Because they appear in substantially the same form, U.C.C. sections are cited
to the corresponding Montana Code section. Section 30-2-202 of the Montana Code is dis-
cussed infra at text accompanying note 50.
[Vol. 55
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The word parol, from the French for oral, refers specifically to that
which is spoken."1 In an early usage, Blackstone stated:
AGAIN; evidence in the trial by jury is of two kinds, either that
which is given in proof, or that which the jury may receive by
their own private knowledge. The former, or proofs, (to which in
common speech the name of evidence is usually confined) are ei-
ther written, or parol, that is, by word of mouth.15
The rule bars not only spoken evidence, but other evidence as well.
The Montana Code statement of the rule does not narrowly refer
to "parol" evidence but broadly states that there can be "no evi-
dence" of the terms. Because it bars all evidence, oral as well as
written, the rule might better be described, as suggested by the
catchline of section 28-2-905,1" as the "extrinsic evidence rule,"
barring evidence extrinsic to the written agreement."1 Although ex-
trinsic evidence usually consists of spoken statements or agree-
ments, it can also take other forms, such as additional documents
or trade usage.
Second, the parol evidence rule is not a rule of evidence but a
rule of substantive contract law. Once they reach a final agree-
ment, the contracting parties may be understood as saying: "Eve-
rything that preceded was just talk. This is for real." That final
agreement is often a writing. The parol evidence rule states as a
rule of contract law that once the parties have reached a final writ-
ten agreement, their prior oral discussions are displaced. If the
substantive purpose of the rule is to distinguish between yester-
day's talk and today's agreement, then the rule was named, in
Corbin's term, "unfortunately. 1 8 Perhaps it should be called the
"Prior Negotiation Rule." The statement of the rule for this pur-
pose is codified in section 28-2-904 of the Montana Code:
Effect of written contract on oral agreements. The execu-
tion of a contract in writing, whether the law requires it to be
14. See infra note 17.
15. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 368 (Philadelphia, Robert Bell 1772).
16. The catchlines (section headings) are generally not part of the law. MONT. CODE
ANN. § 1-11-103(5) (1993). A significant exception is section headings in the U.C.C. See
MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-1-109 (1993).
17. In keeping with tradition, I have no objection to calling it the parol evidence rule,
but please, never the parole evidence rule. The words parol and parole have a common
origin in the old French and Anglo-French parol. Prisoners on parole have "given their
word" that they will not again transgress. As is often the case, the law stuck with the tradi-
tional spelling while modern French and English moved on. 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
489-90 (compact ed. 1971). Lapses into the erroneous spelling are not uncommon. A
Westlaw search employing the query "'parol evidence' and fraud" turned up 416 Montana
state and federal cases; the query "'parole evidence' and fraud" revealed 21 more.
18. 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 574 (1960 & Supp. 1993).
1994]
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written or not, supersedes all the oral negotiations or stipulations
concerning its matter which preceded or accompanied the execu-
tion of the instrument.19
One can now see how sections 28-2-904 and -905 of the Mon-
tana Code work together. When statutes were first enacted in
Montana, the section that is now 28-2-904 was taken from the Cal-
ifornia Civil Code section that had its origin in the Field Code.2
Placed with the substance of contracts, the provision states the ef-
fect a writing has on prior negotiations. In the 1895 Codes and
Statutes of Montana, the provision that is now section 28-2-905
was part of the Code of Civil Procedure, where it was placed with
the rules of evidence.21 That section provides the mechanism to
enforce the exalted status of the writing-by excluding evidence of
the negotiations. The evidence is excluded not because the rules of
evidence say that it is not trustworthy, but because the rules of
contract law say that it is not part of the agreement. When the
Montana Code was adopted in 1978, the provision was moved to its
rightful place in Title 28 with the rules of contract law.
The Montana Supreme Court has been notoriously inconsis-
tent in distinguishing between the parol evidence rule as a rule of
evidence and as a rule of contract law. On the one hand, the court
has applied the rule at the pleading stage, which it would not do
with a rule of evidence. 2 On the other hand, when an appellant
claims that the trial court's admission of testimony violated the
parol evidence rule, the court has frequently held that an appellant
who failed to object to the testimony at trial is barred from raising
the issue on appeal.2" The court would be correct if it were dealing
with a party's failure to make an evidentiary objection. However,
the court is wrong when it fails to apply the substantive law of
contracts to the facts before it. Farnsworth concludes from the
substantive nature of the rule:
19. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-904 (1993). In Norwest Bank Billings v. Murnion, 210
Mont. 417, 422-25, 684 P.2d 1067, 1070-71 (1984), the court pointed out that the trial court
had incorrectly applied § 28-2-904 rather than § 30-2-202 to a transaction involving the sale
of goods. After comparing the two statutes, the court correctly concluded that the result
would be the same under both statutes.
20. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1625 (1872); N.Y. Civ. CODE § 795 (1865) (the original Field
Code). The Field Code was not enacted in New York. See Robert G. Natelson, Running
With the Land in Montana, 51 MONT. L. REV. 17, 35-44 (1990).
21. MONT. REV. CODE § 93-401-13 (1947).
22. See, e.g., Sherrodd, 249 Mont. at 284-86, 815 P.2d at 1136-37.
23. See, e.g., Keller v. Dooling, 248 Mont. 535, 540, 813 P.2d 437, 441 (1991); Dew v.
Dower, 258 Mont. 114, 120, 852 P.2d 549, 552 (1993).
[Vol. 55
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Therefore, under an exclusionary rule of evidence, failure to ob-
ject at trial ordinarily waives any ground of complaint against ad-
mission and the evidence becomes part of the proof in the case.
There is, however, sound authority that an objection based on the
parol evidence rule is not lost by failure to raise it at trial, so that
in this context the parol evidence rule is treated as "substantive"
rather than as "evidentiary. "4
Finally, the rule can be said not to be a rule at all. It is a
cluster of concepts, used for a variety of purposes.2" It also looks
unlike a rule because it is so riddled with exceptions, some of
which are expressed in the statement of the rule itself.2 6 Because of
the many exceptions, it is rarely possible to predict whether a
court will enforce an oral promise alleged to be part of an agree-
ment otherwise in writing. Some commentators, frustrated by the
lack of legal certainty, advocate abandoning the rule."7 This propo-
sal calls to mind the baseball fans' suggestion that close calls at
first base could be eliminated by moving the bag another foot from
home plate.28 Instead of focusing on the rule, critics should start
by identifying the problem.29 With parol evidence, the problem is
finding the agreement that governs the parties at a particular point
in time. Solving that problem is often difficult. Therefore, the close
calls arising from the application of the rule in practice will not be
24. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.2, at 468 (2d ed. 1990). However, authority
exists in support of the court's position. McCormick states:
The principal practical consequence of the now accepted theory that the parol
evidence rule is a rule of substantive law, rather than a rule of evidence, is that a
failure to object to evidence of an oral agreement is not a waiver, as a failure to
assert an objection upon mere exclusionary rule of evidence would be. A few
courts seem to permit the parol evidence rule to be invoked for the first time on
appeal. But the preponderant, and it is believed the fairer, view is that the party
must have raised the question in some fashion at the trial, as by motion for judg-
ment on this ground or by request for instructions, as a condition to his raising it
on appeal.
MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at 433 n.2 (citations omitted). See also Gary D. Spivey, Annota-
tion, Modern Status of Rules Governing Legal Effect of Failure to Object to Admission of
Extrinsic Evidence Violative of Parol Evidence Rule, 81 A.L.R.3d 249 (1977).
25. See Justin Sweet, Contract Making and Parol Evidence: Diagnosis and Treat-
ment of a Sick Rule, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 1036 (1968).
26. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-905 (1993) supra at text accompanying note 13.
27. See, e.g., Note, The Parol Evidence Rule: Is It Necessary?, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 972,
988 (1969).
28. I am cautioned in the use of sports metaphors by some feminist colleagues. See
Ann C. Scales, Surviving Legal De-Education: An Outsider's Guide, 15 VT. L. REV. 139, 151-
52 (1990). I hope this one is helpful in visualizing the problem.
Official Baseball Rule § 1.04 provides in part, "The infield shall be a 90-foot square."
29. Official Baseball Rule § 6.05(j) provides in part: "A batter is out when ... after
[the batter] hits a fair ball, [either the batter] or first base is tagged before [the batter]
touches first base." The rule is often formulated as "a tie goes to the runner."
1994]
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resolved by changing its theoretical expression. An early Pennsyl-
vania case put it perfectly:
There is scarcely any subject more perplexed, than in what
cases, and to what extent, parol evidence shall be admitted. Not
only have different men viewed the subject differently, but the
same man, at different times, has held opinions not easily recon-
ciled, and I doubt whether any lawyer of many years' standing,
and much reflection, can say his mind has never wavered on this
subject. In theory, adhere to the writing-neither see nor hear
anything out of the deed, seems to sound well; and it would work
well in practice, if all who gave instructions to scriveners were
perfect; if all scriveners perfectly understood their instructions,
and put them on paper perfectly according to law, and the whole
was completed, by executing them at the time and in the order
and manner which their nature and the law requires; but when
this perfection cannot be even imagined to exist in this world,
and the want of it is as apparent in deeds and other writings, as
anywhere else, the beautiful theory must yield to substantial
justice.30
To balance theory and substantial justice in the application of the
rule, let us first examine the problem the rule was designed to
solve-finding the agreement of the parties.
III. IN SEARCH OF THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES
Is it that hard to find the parties' agreement? Yes! At one time
the only enforceable agreement was the one made under seal. 1
The idea that a contract is a fixed and immutable document has
been displaced by the view of the contract as a process that pro-
ceeds from negotiation, through execution, through performance
and modification, and continues in the parties' relationship.32 The
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) definitions of agreement and
contract reflect this expansive view of contract. According to the
U.C.C., " '[c]ontract' means the total legal obligation which results
from the parties' agreement" 33 and "'[a]greement' means the bar-
gain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by implica-
tion from other circumstances, including course of dealing or usage
of trade or course of performance as provided in this Code."34 The
30. Thompson v. McClenachan, 17 Serg. & Rawle 110, 113 (Pa. 1827).
31. For better or worse, the distinction between sealed and unsealed instruments has
been abolished. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 1-4-204, 30-2-203 (1993).
32. See, e.g., IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980).
33. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-1-201(11) (1993).
34. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-1-201(3) (1993).
[Vol. 55
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contract, then, is more than the agreement, and the agreement is
found in a number of sources, not in a single written document.
No writing can contain all understandings or provide for all
contingencies. Contract law looks outside the writing on numerous
occasions: to fill gaps where the parties omitted a term; to read in a
default provision where the parties did not create their own rule;
to interpret the meaning of terms; and to supplement terms with
custom and usage, course of performance, and course of dealing.
For example, in a recent case upholding oral modifications of a
written agreement, the court reported approvingly the parties' tes-
timony about the role of the written agreement:
When asked what role the written contract played in the adminis-
tration of the contract and the construction project, Kelley
[MPC's chief operating officer responsible for administration of
the contract] testified:
"Well, the contract is a point of beginning. You've got to
start someplace, as we do on any job. And then you negotiate on a
daily basis and do the job."
In addition, Brad Haines, president of Haines Pipeline, testi-
fied to instances when changes in the contract were made that
were not committed to writing.8 5
At the same time, contract law must have a way of distin-
guishing obligations from "just talk."3 6 In spite of the popular ex-
pression disparaging oral contracts, "It was only a verbal agree-
ment," the fact that an agreement is written rather than oral does
not create this distinction.3 7 The "Prior Negotiation Rule," section
28-2-904 of the Montana Code, got it wrong." A written agreement
that follows oral understandings has no greater legal significance
than an oral agreement that follows written understandings-both
equally displace the prior discussions.3 9 Nevertheless, the former is
more customary. Although there is no obligation to commit agree-
ments to writing, the parties' intention to have a legally operative
35. Haines Pipeline Constr., Inc. v. Montana Power Co., 251 Mont. 422, 429, 830 P.2d
1230, 1235 (1991).
36. The concept of consideration is helpful when there is an absence of consideration,
but because a single consideration can support multiple obligations, its presence does not
help identify the "real" obligations. For example, if A promises B a car, the fact that B did
not offer any consideration makes A's promise unenforceable. If B offered consideration,
that fact does not help determine whether A's obligation involves only the car or also an
alleged oral warranty.
37. Lawyers as well as the lay public often fail to make the distinction between oral,
meaning using the mouth, and verbal, meaning using words. Verbal agreements may be ei-
ther written or oral.
38. See supra text accompanying notes 18-24.
39. CORBIN, supra note 18, § 573.
1994]
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agreement may be clearer when they use a writing. Therefore, once
a signed writing exists, it seems fair to use that writing as a start-
ing point for the parties' intended agreement. In this context, the
parol evidence rule makes sense in placing a burden on the propo-
nent of the oral evidence. A party who alleges oral terms in the
face of a writing should have the burden of explaining why all the
terms were not included in the writing. Similarly, the context ex-
plains why courts are more hostile to evidence that contradicts the
writing. A party who did not intend the provision as drafted to
govern has a difficult burden in explaining why he or she neverthe-
less signed the writing.
While it is no doubt significant that at some point the parties
reduced their agreement to writing and signed the writing, that
moment is not of such overwhelming significance that we must ig-
nore the rest of the story. Consider, for example, the function of
the writing in the context of Sherrodd. Initially, Sherrodd orally
agreed to do the job for $97,500,o but what did this agreement
mean? Was he saying, "I will move all the earth there is for
$97,500"? He had an absolute right to make such a promise, but he
would have been foolish to do so, since he relied solely on COP's
estimate of the quantity of earth. More likely he was saying some-
thing like, "On the basis of your representation that there are
25,000 cubic yards, I will do the job for $97,500" or "I move earth
for $3.90 a cubic yard, so if there are 25,000 cubic yards, then I will
do it for $97,500" or "Based on our mutual assumption that there
are 25,000 cubic yards, I will do the job for $97,500." Note that
each of these agreements is perfectly enforceable under the statute
of frauds. If the only agreement between the parties was oral, then
Sherrodd would have recovered for the additional work done under
any of these interpretations.
Yet there was more to it-the parties committed their agree-
ment to writing. The writing stated that Sherrodd would move
"LS" [lump sum] of earth for $97,500. Now he really seems to have
said, "I will move all the earth there is for $97,500." But he alleged
a side, oral agreement, under which he would be paid for moving
the additional earth that both parties knew about. These facts and
circumstances showing how an agreement came to be made set the
stage for a classic parol evidence problem. The writing stated that
Sherrodd would receive only $97,500 for the job, and the alleged
oral agreement stated that he would receive more."1 Where is the
40. Sherrodd, 249 Mont. at 283-84, 815 P.2d at 1136.
41. Id. at 284, 815 P.2d at 1136.
[Vol. 55
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agreement found?
COP denied making the oral agreement. 2 But the inquiry
does not differ if COP admitted the side agreement. The issue is
not whether it was said, but whether it was part of the agreement.
COP was perfectly free to say, "Sure we said it, but we said lots of
other things too. And we agreed that the only things we said that
would count are the ones found in the writing." Thus the parol
evidence rule transforms a question of fact into a question of law.
The inquiry is not whether the oral agreement was made but
whether the oral agreement is legally enforceable.
In deciding whether the oral agreement is legally enforceable,
it is important to begin with the proposition that in general, there
is nothing wrong with oral promises. The Montana Code provides
that "[a]ll contracts may be oral except such as are specially re-
quired by statute to be in writing. ' 43 Oral contracts may present
problems of proof, so the law may want to discourage their making,
but it does not deny them enforcement, with the few exceptions
collectively known as the statute of frauds." There is also, of
course, nothing wrong with contracts being written. It follows,
then, that there is nothing wrong with a contract being partly writ-
ten and partly oral. The evidence of the contract may be found
equally in the writing and in other evidence, including oral
evidence. 45
Does the parol evidence rule affect this conclusion? Let us
look at the statute more closely. It begins: "Whenever the terms
of an agreement have been reduced to writing by the parties, [the
agreement] is to be considered as containing all those terms."' 6
This sentence says nothing more than that the written terms of the
agreement are part of the agreement. So far, the rule does not ex-
press a bias in favor of the written terms, for the agreement could
contain oral terms as well. But it goes on to state: "Therefore,
42. Id.
43. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-901 (1993).
44. Statute of frauds provisions, requiring that certain agreements be evidenced by a
written memorandum, are scattered throughout the Montana Code. Significant sources are
§§ 28-2-903, 28-10-203, 30-1-206, 30-2-201, 30-11-111, and 71-1-203.
45. The court's bias against oral agreements occasionally results in confusion between
the parol evidence rule and the statute of frauds. See, e.g., Aye v. Fix, 176 Mont. 474, 477,
580 P.2d 97, 98 (1978):
Evidence relating to any oral agreements between the parties should have
been excluded under the statute of frauds, since the parties' agreement had been
reduced to writing. Montana law is clear that evidence of oral representations,
relating directly to the subject matter of a contract, is not admissible to add to or
alter the provisions of a written contract.
46. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-905(1) (1993).
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there can be between the parties . . . no evidence of the terms of
the agreement other than the contents of the writing .... 1,7 The
word therefore suggests a logical conclusion. And what is that con-
clusion? That there can be no evidence of the terms of the agree-
ment other than what is in the writing. This sentence could be say-
ing one of two things. First, that the writing is the only part of the
agreement. Both logic and experience tell us that this is not so.
This conclusion certainly does not follow from the statement that
the written terms are part of the agreement. We also know that an
agreement can be partly written and partly oral, can have blanks
in it, can require gap fillers, and so forth. Therefore, this meaning
is preposterous. Second, the sentence could be saying that there
can be no evidence of those terms that are in writing other than
the contents of the writing. This interpretation makes more sense.
In drafting, the same language should always mean the same
thing." If the phrase "the terms of the agreement" in the second
sentence is understood consistently with the phrase "the terms of
an agreement" in the first sentence, it refers to those terms that
are reduced to writing. This interpretation is also consistent with
the parol evidence rule as a "Prior Negotiation Rule": the written
terms were intended to replace earlier negotiations."9 Therefore,
the rule does not exclude evidence of all oral terms, but only of
those that contradict the written terms. The rule leaves open the
possibility of additional oral terms that are equally part of the
agreement.
This second interpretation finds expression in the more mod-
ern statement of the parol evidence rule found in the U.C.C.:
Final written expression-parol or extrinsic evidence.
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of
the parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing in-
tended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement
with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be
contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contem-
poraneous oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented:
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (30-1-205) or by
course of performance (30-2-208); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the
court finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete
47. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-905(1).
48. "The Golden Rule of Drafting is: Never change your language unless you wish to
change your meaning and always change your language if you wish to change your mean-
ing." SCOTT J. BURNHAM, THE CONTRACT DRAFTING GUIDEBOOK § 16.4.5 (1992).
49. See supra text accompanying notes 18-24.
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and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.50
In this statement of the rule, evidence is inadmissible when the
writing is "intended by the parties as a final expression of their
agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein."51
That is, the evidence is excluded not merely because the terms are
reduced to writing but only after it is determined that the parties
intended that writing to represent the final expression of those
terms. Furthermore, the evidence that is excluded is only that
which contradicts the writing, leaving open the possibility of addi-
tional oral terms to supplement the writing. According to subsec-
tion (b), however, the supplementary terms may also be excluded if
the writing was "intended also as a complete and exclusive state-
ment of the terms of the agreement."" s The inquiry therefore shifts
from the fact of the writing to what the parties intended by the
fact of a writing.
It is now clear that there is an exception to the general rule
that there is nothing wrong with a contract being partly written
and partly oral. There is something wrong with a contract that is
partly written and partly oral if the parties intended the contract
to be entirely written. This concept is called integration or merger,
for the entire agreement can be viewed as integrated or merged in
the writing.
The concept of integration lies at the heart of parol evidence
analysis. A court must first determine whether the parties intended
the writing to be the final and complete expression of their agree-
ment. If the answer is yes, then the oral understandings may be
excluded. If the answer is no, then the oral understandings have
equal weight with the writing. All too often a court concludes,
without analysis of the integration issue, that a writing represents
the entire agreement of the parties. For example, in Sherrodd, the
majority stated:
Section 28-2-905, [of the Montana Code], provides that when an
agreement has been reduced to writing by the parties, there can
be no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the con-
tents of the writing except when a mistake or imperfection of the
writing is claimed or when the validity of the agreement is the
fact in dispute."3
This statement in Sherrodd, followed by the application of the
50. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-202 (1993).
51. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-202.
52. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-202(b) (1993).
53. Sherrodd, 249 Mont. at 285, 815 P.2d at 1136-37.
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parol evidence rule at the pleading stage to exclude 'vidence of the
oral understanding, demonstrates one of the most important as-
pects of parol evidence analysis: The rule transforms what would
otherwise be a question of fact to be decided by a jury into a ques-
tion of law to be decided by a court. The function of a court in
administering the parol evidence rule gives preference to the writ-
ten evidence. 54 Therefore, as McCormick observed, the rule indi-
rectly favors the party with stronger bargaining power who drafted
the writing:
The types of transaction wherein is involved this kind of competi-
tion between claims based upon writings and those based upon
alleged oral agreements dealing with the same affair, are infinitely
various, but usually if there is a difference between the two par-
ties in economic status, the one who relies upon the writing is
likely to be among the "haves," and the one who seeks escape
through the oral word will probably be ranged among the "have
nots," in Sancho Panza's classification. The average jury will,
other things being equal, lean strongly in favor of the side which
is threatened with possible injustice and certain hardship by the
enforcement of the writing.5
This pattern is, of course, represented by the parties in Sherrodd.
Acknowledging the majority's view that written agreements should
be reliable on their face, Justice Trieweiler in dissent stated that
''a justice system worth its salt should have equal compassion for
Montana's many subcontractors who, while operating without the
benefit of legal advice, sign whatever is necessary in order to keep
their operations afloat and their crews at work."5 Trieweiler was
fully aware that his position would take the question out of the
hands of a court: "I would reverse the judgment of the District
Court and remand for a jury trial to determine the merits of the
plaintiff's claim. That is really all the protection that Montana's
general contractors need." '57
In Sherrodd, the Montana Supreme Court used the parol evi-
dence rule to serve a number of functions:
* Prevention of Perjury. Oral expressions are not as reliable as
written expressions. A party might inexactly recall what was said
or make it up entirely. If the court excludes evidence of the oral
expressions and limits itself to the fixed expressions of the writ-
54. See Charles T. McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for
Control of the Jury, 41" YAE L.J. 365 (1932).
55. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at 428.
56. Sherrodd, 249 Mont. at 289, 815 P.2d at 1139.
57. Id.
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ing, then there is little dispute about what was said and less pos-
sibility of error.
- Judicial Efficiency. If a court does not have to listen to the tes-
timony but can make determinations on the basis of the writing,
then it can decide issues much more quickly. In fact, many cases
can be disposed of in the motion stage. In addition, because the
parol evidence rule is a matter of substantive law, the issue can
be decided by the judge without consulting the jury.
- Channeling Behavior. If contracting parties know that there is a
parol evidence rule that will be strictly enforced, then they have
an incentive to put all their understandings in writing. Good busi-
ness practices would thereby be promoted.
A problem with all of these functions is that they conflict with
the primary function of contract law-to carry out the agreement
of the parties. As previously discussed, the parol evidence rule can
and should serve that function." At best, courts use the parol evi-
dence rule as a tool in the process of finding the agreement of the
parties. At worst, courts use the rule to tell the parties how to
make their agreements, punishing them for failing to reduce their
agreements to writing.
Neither statutes nor common law requires that contracts be
reduced to writing. Yet the court finds it to be the "public policy"
of the state to encourage writings in order to discourage uncer-
tainty. 9 Where does this bias against oral agreements come from?
The bias seems particularly alien in a society that values informal
commitments, speaking respectfully of "a handshake deal" or one
whose "word is his bond."60
Perhaps its origin lies in the Field Code, the source of the
Montana contract statutes.6 " The Field Code was the American
culmination of the nineteenth-century codification movement.
Distressed that the common law was so indeterminate as to appear
arbitrary, the codifiers wished to make the law explicit and accessi-
ble, not synthesized from cases and principles, but found in black
letters in bound volumes. The Field Code Commissioners stated:
The question whether a Code is desirable is simply a ques-
58. See supra text accompanying notes 31-34.
59. See Sherrodd, 249 Mont. at 286, 815 P.2d at 1137 (citing Baker v. Bailey, 240
Mont. 139, 143, 782 P.2d 1286, 1288 (1989)).
60. "An honest man's word is as good as his bond." MIGUEL DE CERVANTES, DON QUIX-
OTE DE LA MANCHA, pt. II, bk. IV, ch. 34 quoted in JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS
196 (Emily M. Beck ed., 14th ed. 1968).
61. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
1994]
15
Burnham: The Parol Evidence Rule
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1994
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
tion between written and unwritten law.
That this was ever debatable is one of the most remarkable
facts in the history of jurisprudence. If the law is a thing to be
obeyed, it is a thing to be known, and if it is to be known, there
can be no better, not to say no other, method of making it known
than of writing and publishing it."
In other words, the codification movement was itself a rebellion
against the perceived arbitrariness of the oral word and a celebra-
tion of the sanctity of the written word in legislation. The same
rationale applies to contracts, which can be described as private
law-making. It is probably no coincidence that the drafters of the
Field Code included a number of provisions in the contracts sec-
tion that discourage oral contracts."
Of course, the parol evidence rule survives in jurisdictions that
have not codified contract law. Even in those jurisdictions, the rule
represents a longing for the formalism and certainty of writings."
Nevertheless, Montana seems to be more strict in its application of
the rule than other jurisdictions. This strictness may be seen by
contrasting the Field Code provision with the more modern provi-
sion of Article 2 of the U.C.C., which was enacted in Montana in
1963 and overrides the Field Code provision with respect to trans-
actions in goods."
California, which also enacted the Field Code version of the
parol evidence rule, has not moved it from the Code of Civil Proce-
dure, but amended it in 1978 to reflect the understanding of the
integration concept:
Terms set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a
final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as
are included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any
prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement."
62. CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE
CODE, at vii (1865).
63. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 28-2-804 (written instrument presumptive evidence
of consideration), 28-2-1602 (modification of written contract) (1993), and the many statutes
accepting a writing in lieu of consideration.
64. See MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at 430 n.4.
65. Article 2 generally concerns the sale of goods. Article 2A, enacted in 1991, concerns
the leasing of goods and contains an analogous statement of the parol evidence rule at § 30-
2A-202 of the Montana Code.
66. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1856(a) (West 1983) (emphasis added). The California
Code also makes explicit the function of the judge. Section 1856(d) provides:
The court shall determine whether the writing is intended by the parties as a final
expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein
and whether the writing is intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of
the terms of the agreement.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1856(d) (West 1983).
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As seen in the California and U.C.C. pronouncements of the rule, a
more exact statement of the rule would provide that "when an
agreement has been reduced to writing by the parties, and the par-
ties intend the writing to contain their entire agreement, then
there can be no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than
the contents of the writing." This statement indicates the most dif-
ficult step in the application of the parol evidence rule-how to
determine whether the parties intended the writing to contain
their entire agreement.
Only when the parties intend the writing to contain their en-
tire agreement does the parol evidence rule exclude other evidence.
Conversely, the parol evidence rule applies only when the extrinsic
evidence is offered as part of the agreement. Very often, the evi-
dence is offered for other purposes. Before addressing the applica-
tion of the rule, it may be helpful to examine situations in which
the evidence is offered for other purposes. Distinguishing between
situations in which the parol evidence rule does and does not apply
will help narrow the inquiry.
IV. NOT THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
In the classic case, Party P alleges that Party D said X. P may
offer evidence of X either in pleading or at trial. At the pleading
stage, D moves for dismissal or for summary judgment on the
grounds that if the pleaded material is excluded under the parol
evidence rule, then P fails to state a claim. At trial, when P offers
the evidence, D's attorney interjects, "Objection! Parol Evidence
Rule." Similarly, D's expectation is that if the evidence is ex-
cluded, P will not be able to prove an element of the claim. At
either of these stages, the appropriate procedure for the judge is to
ask P's attorney two questions. First, "What evidence are you of-
fering?" Second, "For what purpose are you offering it?"
This functional analysis will bring greater clarity to the analy-
sis of parol evidence issues. In briefing a pretrial motion, the attor-
ney for the party offering the evidence should address these ques-
tions. Whether addressed by the brief or not, judges should begin
their analysis with them. During a trial, the judge should expressly
ask these questions. The first question focuses on exactly what ex-
trinsic evidence is being offered. Obviously a court must first hear
the evidence before determining whether to exclude it under the
rule. Because application of the rule is a question of law, a court
should hear the evidence outside the presence of the jury for pur-
poses of this determination.
The second question focuses on why the evidence is being of-
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fered 6 7 In a true parol evidence issue, P offers X to show that X is
part of the original contract between the parties, usually for the
purpose of proving that D did not perform according to X and is
therefore in breach. If a court decides to exclude the evidence, at
the pretrial stage it will decide whether P has a claim without that
element. At trial, a court will instruct the witness not to testify to
X and will bring back the jury. If a court decides to admit the
evidence, at the pretrial stage it will assume that the facts as al-
leged are true for purposes of the motion and make a determina-
tion on that basis. At trial, a court will allow the jury to hear the
evidence and determine as a matter of fact whether X actually oc-
curred. Because the rule is a rule of substantive law, the judge can
exclude the evidence as a matter of law even if D has not objected
to it. Further, the judge can instruct the jury not to consider the
excluded evidence even if the jury has heard it."'
In most cases, P does not offer X to show that X is part of the
original contract between the parties, but offers X for some other
purpose. These cases do not involve the parol evidence rule. It is,
therefore, extremely important that lawyers and judges ask the
second question: For what purpose is the evidence offered? Among
the many possible responses to this question are the following:
A. Collateral Agreement. X is part of a second contract between
the parties (and because D did not perform according to X,
breach occurs).
B. Interpretation. X explains the meaning of a term of the con-
tract (and if the term is interpreted according to X, then breach
occurs).
C. Modification. Although X was not originally part of the con-
tract, we modified the contract to include X (and because D did
not perform according to X, breach occurs).
D. Lack of Assent. Because of X, P did not freely assent to the
contract (and therefore either no contract exists or the contract
should be reformed to include X).
E. Consumer Protection Act. D's expression of X constitutes a
violation of the Consumer Protection Act (entitling P to damages
under the Act).
67. In Pipe Industrial Insurance Fund Trust of Local 41 v. Consolidated Pipe Trades
Trust, the court stated: "This Court's decisions interpreting section 28-2-905 [of the Mon-
tana Code] and the language of the statute itself, demonstrate that parol evidence may be
admitted for one purpose, but not for another." 233 Mont. 162, 167, 760 P.2d 711, 714
(1988) (citations omitted).
68. See supra text accompanying notes 18-24.
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F. Bad Faith. D's expression of X violates the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing (entitling P to damages for breach of con-
tract, unless P and D are in a special relationship, in which case P
is entitled to tort damages).
Each of these cases involves parol evidence in the general
sense: P's testimony is an offer of proof of extrinsic evidence, usu-
ally an oral statement. Parol evidence, however, has a narrower
meaning in the context of the parol evidence rule. Recall that the
purpose of the rule is to determine whether the agreement consists
of the writing alone, or the writing as supplemented by oral under-
standings. Because the evidence is not offered for that purpose in
these examples, the examples do not involve the parol evidence
rule. Let us examine them in greater detail.
A. Collateral Agreement
If nothing is wrong with oral contracts, then nothing is wrong
with parties having two contracts, one written and one oral. For
example, D contracts to sell her house to P. The written agreement
between them states that D is selling P no personal property. P
then alleges, "Just before we signed the contract, D said, 'I'll in-
clude the refrigerator for $100,' and I said, 'It's a deal.' " D invokes
the parol evidence rule to bar P's testimony. The rule is not appli-
cable, for there is no problem with the parties having two agree-
ments, one written and one oral.
In this situation, the oral agreement is called a collateral
agreement. The court failed to recognize the possibility of a collat-
eral agreement in Eiselein v. Montana Bank.6 9 Plaintiff ranchers
alleged that defendant bank orally promised them a $150,000 loan
commitment and also entered into a written agreement to loan
them $35,000.70 Holding that evidence of the oral agreement was
inadmissible under the parol evidence rule because the entire
agreement was merged in the writing, the court refused to enforce
the oral promise.7 This analysis overlooked the likelihood of a col-
lateral agreement, as Justice Trieweiler pointed out in a concurring
opinion." Trieweiler correctly observed that the parties could have
made two separate agreements, one oral and one written. He
agreed with the result, however, because even if admissible, the de-
fendant's alleged promise was not enforceable as a matter of law."
69. 250 Mont. 71, 818 P.2d 365 (1991).
70. Eiselein, 250 Mont. at 72-73, 818 P.2d at 366.'
71. Id. at 75, 818 P.2d at 367-68.
72. Id. at 75-80, 818 P.2d at 368-71.
73. Id. at 79-80, 818 P.2d at 370-71.
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The situation Trieweiler discussed in Eiselein arises fre-
quently. A party's alleged collateral agreement often fails because
the promise is not legally enforceable, usually because of lack of
consideration. For example, if P alleges, "Just before we signed the
contract, D said, 'I'll include the refrigerator,' and I said, 'It's a
deal,'" then the alleged collateral agreement would fail for lack of
consideration-P is exchanging nothing for D's promise of the re-
frigerator. There would be consideration if the refrigerator was in-
cluded in the price P agreed to pay for the house. Therefore, P
must prove that the written agreement does not represent the en-
tire agreement of the parties, but was supplemented with an oral
promise. If offered for this purpose, the evidence would invoke pa-
rol evidence rule analysis.
B. Interpretation
If the purpose of the parol evidence rule is to find the agree-
ment, then logically a court must first find the terms of the agree-
ment before it can determine what they mean. Therefore deter-
mining what the terms mean is not a question involving the parol
evidence rule, as recognized in the statutes.74 On a question of in-
terpretation, however, most courts follow an analysis analogous to
the parol evidence rule analysis. The first step is to determine
what evidence a party wishes to offer to show the meaning of a
term. A court will generally allow evidence as to what a term
means only after determining that the term is ambiguous. But
should a court allow extrinsic evidence to prove that the term is
ambiguous? Just as it allows extrinsic evidence to determine
whether an agreement is integrated in parol evidence rule analysis,
a court will generally hear the evidence to prove that a term is
74. Section 28-2-905(2) of the Montana Code provides: "This section does not exclude
other evidence of the circumstances under which the agreement was made or to which it
relates, as described in 1-4-102, or other evidence to explain an extrinsic ambiguity or to
establish illegality or fraud." MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-905(2) (1993)
An example of an extrinsic ambiguity is the issue of whether a document that purports
to be a deed is in reality a mortgage. See, e.g., Boysun v. Boysun, 140 Mont. 85, 368 P.2d
439 (1962).
Section 1-4-102 of the Montana Code provides:
Consideration of circumstances surrounding execution. For the proper
construction of an instrument, the circumstances under which it was made, in-
cluding the situation of the subject of the instrument and of the parties to it, may
also be shown so that the judge be placed in the position of those whose language
he is to interpret.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-4-102 (1993).
Section 30-2-202 of the Montana Code provides that the written terms may be "ex-
plained" by extrinsic evidence. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-202 (1993).
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ambiguous after excusing the jury." A court will then determine as
a matter of law whether the term is ambiguous. If it determines
that the term is not ambiguous, then a court does not admit the
evidence. If it determines that the term is ambiguous, then because
determination of what the term means is a question of fact, a court
permits the jury to hear the evidence and determine the meaning
of the term.
The Montana courts have fairly consistently recognized this
exception to the parol evidence rule.76 In Weinberg v. Farmers
State Bank, the court correctly distinguished between parol evi-
dence used to explain and to modify an agreement, allowing evi-
dence on the meaning of a promissory note.7 In Weston v. Mon-
tana State Highway Commission, the plaintiff claimed that the
word "supervisor" in a written agreement meant "non-supervi-
sor. ' 8 After reviewing the evidence on the issue of ambiguity, the
court stated that "[t]he language in the contract is clear and un-
ambiguous. We find no need for further interpretation and/or pa-
role [sic] evidence. 7"
In Payne v. Buechler,80 however, the court got off the track by
addressing the interpretation issue before it first found the agree-
ment. Plaintiff broker sued for a commission because even though
he did not sell the house, the written contract he produced stated
that his right to sell was exclusive. Defendant offered to prove that
the right to sell was in fact non-exclusive, but, invoking the parol
evidence rule, the court refused to admit that evidence.81 That rea-
soning might have been correct if defendant had alleged either an
oral agreement that contradicted the written agreement or that
"exclusive" meant "non-exclusive." But that was not the nature of
her proof. Defendant wished to testify that on her copy of the
agreement, the parties had stricken the word "exclusive" and writ-
ten in "non-exclusive." Because her copy had been destroyed, she
attempted to testify to its contents but was barred from doing so.8"
Justice Shea's dissent correctly stated that the parol evidence rule
75. By determining that a term is not ambiguous and then declaring its meaning, a
court reserves for itself what would otherwise be a jury question. As with parol evidence,
this approach may reflect a distrust of juries. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 24, § 7.14.
76. See, e.g., Holman v. Hansen, 237 Mont. 198, 773 P.2d 1200 (1989); Martin v. Lau-
rel Cable TV, Inc., 215 Mont. 229, 696 P.2d 454 (1985).
77. 231 Mont. 10, 24-25, 752 P.2d 719, 728 (1988).
78. 186 Mont. 46, 48, 606 P.2d 150, 151 (1980).
79. Weston, 186 Mont. at 49, 606 P.2d at 152.
80. 192 Mont. 311, 628 P.2d 646 (1981).
81. Payne, 192 Mont. at 315-18, 628 P.2d at 648-50.
82. Id.
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would not exclude this testimony. 3 It was a question of fact
whether the agreement was found in plaintiff's or defendant's ver-
sion. The finder of fact first had to determine that the agreement
was found in the broker's copy of the agreement before the court
as a matter of law could bar extrinsic evidence of understandings
not contained in that writing."'
C. Modification
Once the parties have made the agreement for today, they are
free to modify it tomorrow. The parol evidence rule, which bars
evidence only of understandings made before the parties reduced
the agreement to writing, does not apply to understandings made
after that time. 5 Although determining whether a modification is
effective does not represent an application of the parol evidence
rule, as with interpretation, the analysis is analogous. The first
step is to find the original agreement. Next, the evidence establish-
ing the alleged modification may be heard. Finally, it can be deter-
mined whether the modification in fact occurred and whether it is
permitted as a matter of substantive contract law.
The policies behind the parol evidence rule also are evident in
the rules on modification. The distrust of oral agreements is re-
flected in section 28-2-1602 of the Montana Code, which provides:
How written contract may be altered by parties. A con-
tract in writing may be altered by a contract in writing or by an
83. Id. at 328, 628 P.2d at 655. Justice Shea reasoned, citing the language of § 28-2-
905(1)(b):
The validity of the agreement is "the fact in dispute" and therefore falls
within the exception listed in section 28-2-905(1)(b) [of the Montana Code]. That
is, the plaintiff broker contends he had an exclusive listing and was therefore enti-
tled to a commission. But the defendant owner contends the broker had only a
"nonexclusive" listing, and that he wrote "nonexclusive" on her copy of the listing
agreement. Assuming the defendant to be correct, the listing agreement being held
by the plaintiff broker would be invalid as an "exclusive" listing. Applied here, it
would mean that under the facts here, the plaintiff could not collect a commission.
Id.
84. The arguments about allowing extrinsic evidence on interpretation issues are well
developed in California. Compare Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rig-
ging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644 (Cal. 1968) (in which Justice Traynor states that the issue is
"whether-the offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of the
instrument is reasonably susceptible") with Trident Center v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins.
Co., 847 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1988) (in which Judge Kozinski states, "While this rule
creates much business for lawyers and an occasional windfall to some clients, it leads only to
frustration and delay for most litigants and clogs already overburdened courts."). See also
Olivia W. Karlin & Louis W. Karlin, The California Parol Evidence Rule, 21 Sw. U. L. REV.
1361 (1992).
85. See Trad Indus., Ltd. v. Brogan, 246 Mont. 439, 444-45, 805 P.2d 54, 58 (1991).
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executed oral agreement, and not otherwise."6
The court has determined that in this statute, the word "executed"
means performed by both parties. 7 Many parties in Montana have
performed their part of an oral modification of a written agreement
only to find that the modification is not enforceable because the
other party has not performed-usually by not paying them for
their performance! The hardship of these results might be miti-
gated by application of the doctrine of waiver.88
The majority in Sherrodd wrongly addressed modification
when it stated:
Next we consider Sherrodd's claim that COP officers induced
Sherrodd officers to sign the contract with the promise that more
money would be paid than the contract provided. Section 28-2-
1602 [of the Montana Code] provides that a written contract may
be altered only by a subsequent contract in writing or by an exe-
cuted oral agreement."
If the representation was made before the written contract was
signed, then clearly it could not have been a modification of that
written contract. Instead of a modification issue, the facts present
a true parol evidence issue-whether the agreement consisted
solely of the written contract or the written contract as supple-
mented by the oral understanding.
D. Lack of Assent
Lack of assent represents an exception to the parol evidence
rule because the basis for the rule is the agreement of the parties:
once the parties have agreed that the writing represents the entire
agreement, then extrinsic evidence may not be admitted. Because
contracts are voluntary acts, a party who does not freely assent
cannot create an agreement.90 Therefore, parties are free to intro-
duce evidence showing that no contract was formed because they
lacked assent. This exception is also provided for in the statute."
Extrinsic evidence is generally permitted to prove all the
traditional defenses that show lack of formation of a contract: of-
86. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-1602 (1993).
87. See, e.g., Winkel v. Family Health Care, P.C., 205 Mont. 40, 45-46, 668 P.2d 208,
210-11 (1983).
88. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-209(5) (1993) (providing that an oral modifica-
tion may operate as a waiver of a provision in an agreement requiring that modifications be
in writing).
89. Sherrodd, 249 Mont. at 286, 815 P.2d at 1137.
90. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-401 (1993).
91. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-905(1)(b) (1993).
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fer, acceptance, consideration, capacity, illegality, duress, fraud,
mistake, and the like. Evidence of a condition precedent is also
permitted to prove an understanding that some event must occur
before the obligations in the writing become performable. The par-
ticular issues that arise under the fraud exception, which were
raised in Sherrodd, are discussed in a later part of this Article.2
If the parties omit an understanding by mistake, the writing
should be revised to include the omitted provision under the equi-
table doctrine of reformation. A writing is clearly not integrated
when the parties have failed to include one of their understandings
in it. As Calamari and Perillo concisely put it, "Contracts are not
reformed for mistake; writings are."93 This conception of mistake
makes clear the ethical obligation of an attorney in this situation.
An attorney cannot use the parol evidence rule as a shield, saying,
"Ha ha! I admit we agreed to that, but we also agreed that the
writing would represent our entire agreement, so you can't have
that included." The attorney must agree to reform the writing that
excluded the agreed-upon provision. 4 Nor can an attorney allow
the client to make the decision as to whether to inform the other
side of the mistake.9 5 The document simply does not represent the
parties' agreement. According to this reasoning, the result should
be no different if a provision is omitted intentionally rather than
mistakenly. That is, the parties come to an understanding and
agree that the writing will not include a particular understanding
they have. A classic example is the commissioned salesman who is
told by the boss that he will be paid a higher commission than that
stated in the contract in order to conceal the higher payment from
other salespersons. In this situation, a party cannot claim mistake,
but because the writing does not represent the agreement, it
should be reformed.96
92. See infra text accompanying notes 156-92.
93. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 9-31, at 392 (3d ed. 1987).
94. Section 28-2-1611 of the Montana Code provides:
When written contract may be revised by court. When, through fraud or a
mutual mistake of the parties or a mistake of one party while the other at the
time knew or suspected, a written contract does not truly express the intention of
the parties, it may be revised on the application of a party aggrieved so as to
express that intention, so far as it can be done without prejudice to rights ac-
quired by third persons in good faith and for value.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-1611 (1993).
95. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1518 (1986).
96. 3 GEORGE E. PALMER, LAW OF RESTITUTION § 13.10, at 68 (1978). Palmer states:
If the agreement for commissions had been omitted from the writing by mistake,
it would be given effect in equity through a decree for reformation. There are no
sufficiently persuasive reasons for a different result because the incorrect expres-
sion was intentional. In each case the trier of the facts must be satisfied that there
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E. Consumer Protection Act
In this example, P offers the evidence not to prove that X is
part of the contract but to prove that D's statement of X violated
the Consumer Protection Act (CPA).9' Claims brought under the
CPA have many advantages over claims at common law, not the
least of which is that the parol evidence rule does not apply to a
claim arising under the CPA. As stated by the Texas Court of Ap-
peals, "To apply the parol evidence rule in [Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices Act] cases would frustrate the legislature's purpose in passing
the statute without furthering the objectives of the parol evidence
rule."98
The CPA does not require plaintiffs to prove that there was a
contract or that there was fraud, but simply that they suffered a
loss because the other party employed an unfair or deceptive act or
practice. In other words, the making of the statement constitutes
the claim; whether the statement is part of a contract is irrelevant.
For example, a used car dealer states during negotiation that if
anything goes wrong with the car during the first thirty days, the
dealer will fix it. The writing states that the car is sold "as is"
without any warranty. When the car breaks down in the first thirty
days, the seller refuses to fix it, claiming that the writing repre-
sents the entire agreement.
If the buyer claims common law breach of contract, the buyer
will probably lose because under parol evidence rule analysis, the
oral statement is not part of the contract. If the buyer claims
fraud, the buyer will probably lose because the subject of the fraud
is directly addressed in the contract.99 However, the buyer should
be successful under the CPA. Under the administrative regulations
adopted in Montana, it is an unfair or deceptive act or practice for
a seller "to state that a transaction involves rights, remedies or ob-
ligations that it does not involve"1 ' or for a motor vehicle dealer
to "misrepresent warranty coverage." 101 The court has recently rec-
was such an oral agreement, and that this was the agreement the parties meant to
put into effect.
Id.
97. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-133 (1993).
98. Honeywell v. Imperial Condominium Ass'n, 716 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Tex. Ct. App.
1986); see also Love v. Keith, 383 S.E.2d 674, 677 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) ("Where, as here, the
evidence was submitted not to vary, add to, or contradict the contract, but rather to prove
an unfair or deceptive practice, the parol evidence rule will not bar its admission.").
99. See infra text accompanying notes 166-69.
100. MONT. ADMIN. R. 8.78.101(1)(1) (Supp. 1991).
101. MONT. ADMIN. R. 8.78.204(8) (Supp. 1991).
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ognized the breadth of the CPA.10 2 The successful plaintiff under
the Act may recover minimum damages, treble damages, and attor-
neys' fees, provisions clearly intended to have a deterrent effect on
those who engage in deceptive practices.
F. Bad Faith
The court has clearly established that in Montana the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is found in every con-
tract.10 3 The conduct required by the covenant is statutorily de-
fined in Montana as "honesty in fact and the observance of reason-
able commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade. 1 04 The
duty is probably breached when a promisor makes a false promise,
for to promise something without any intention of performing it is
not honest.105 As discussed above, a consumer could bring a claim
under the Consumer Protection Act. A party who is not a con-
sumer might make an analogous bad faith claim, raising the fact
that D said X, not for the purpose of showing that X is part of the
agreement, but for the purpose of showing that D's statement of X
was a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.
This claim was made unsuccessfully in Farris v. Hutchin-
son.106 Plaintiff alleged that defendant, her employer, told her that
her position was permanent, even though a written contract stated
that it was for one year. She did not allege breach of a term of the
contract, for under Story breach of the contract is not necessary
for a claim of bad faith. The majority nevertheless held that "the
consideration of oral negotiations between the [defendant] and
[plaintiff] prior to the signing of the contracts is barred by the Pa-
rol Evidence Rule." 107 The court apparently found that because
plaintiff did not allege that the conduct prior to the signing consti-
tuted fraud, the conduct was not admissible to prove bad faith.
The majority was particularly persuaded by the fact that the
alleged oral representation contradicted the express term of the
agreement: "[Iln suits of good faith and fair dealing relative to ter-
mination at the expiration of the term, the alleged implied cove-
102. See Baird v. Norwest Bank, 255 Mont. 317, 843 P.2d 327 (1992).
103. Story v. City of Bozeman, 242 Mont. 436, 450, 791 P.2d 767, 775 (1990).
104. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-1-211 (1993) (entitled "Implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing").
105. Section 27-1-712(2)(d) of the Montana Code defines deceit as "a promise made
without any intention of performing it." MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-712(2)(d) (1993).
106. 254 Mont. 334, 838 P.2d 374 (1992).
107. Farris, 254 Mont. at 338, 838 P.2d at 376.
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nant cannot be in direct contradiction of the written term con-
tract." ' 8 In this reasoning, the majority confused the parol
evidence rule with the exception that allows evidence showing lack
of assent, in this instance because of fraud.10 9 The written contract
specified a term of one year.110 The parol evidence offered was a
promise of employment for a longer term.' 1' When the court stated
that "the implied covenant cannot be in direct contradiction of the
written term contract,""' 2 by implied covenant it meant the oral
promise that plaintiff sought to enforce. In traditional parol evi-
dence analysis, the court would be correct. But here the implied
covenant meant the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing. That is, plaintiff offered the evidence not for the purpose of
proving that the oral representation was part of the substance of
the contract but for the purpose of showing that the behavior of
defendant constituted bad faith. To suggest that behavior contra-
dicts a term is illogical. The court used the fraud analogy, finding
that there cannot be bad faith, just as there cannot be fraud, when
the alleged false representation directly contradicts the contract
term. The court might better have used the Consumer Protection
Act analogy: defendant engaged in bad behavior-actionable be-
havior-independently of what the contract said.
Justice Hunt's dissent in Farris clearly identified the weakness
in the majority opinion:
Under the holding of this case, an employer may make significant
oral representations to an employee concerning the terms of the
employment, induce the employee to sign a written contract with
provisions contrary to the oral representations on the basis that
the written contract is only a formality, and then completely
avoid all liability for the oral misrepresentations which induced
the employee to sign the written contract in the first place. The
majority opinion prohibits an employee from even presenting evi-
dence of the wrongdoing, encourages employers to deal dishon-
estly with employees, and leaves a large segment of the working
population (destined to grow larger as employers familiarize
themselves with the majority opinion) without any legal
recourse.113
The dissent argued that the facts of the case fell under the fraud
108. Id. (citations omitted).
109. The majority also confused the parol evidence rule with modification, for the
quoted passage was followed by a citation to § 28-2-1602 of the Montana Code. Id.
110. Id. at 336, 838 P.2d at 375.
111. Id. at 337, 838 P.2d at 376.
112. Id. at 338, 838 P.2d at 376.
113. Id. at 342, 838 P.2d at 378-79.
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exception to the parol evidence rule, reasoning that even though
plaintiff did not allege fraud, "the rationale for the exception to
the parol evidence rule applies equally to both situations."' 1 4 The
dissent expressed a fear that a rule that was designed to prevent
fraud would in fact encourage fraud. The court in Farris used the
parol evidence rule to channel behavior. But which direction
should channeling take, telling parties not to make false represen-
tations or telling parties not to pay any attention to them? The
majority took the latter course, putting the burden on the victim,
while the dissent took the former course, putting the burden on
the perpetrator.
The point that behavior can violate the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing was also missed by the court in
Sherrodd:
Because of the inadmissibility of Sherrodd's evidence as to
alleged misrepresentations, the claim of breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing also fails. There is no allegation of any
violation of the express terms of the written contract, as would be
required in this arms-length contract under our opinion in Story
v. City of Bozeman (1990), 242 Mont. 436, 791 P.2d 767.115
Bad faith is not limited to a party's violation of express terms. Bad
faith is lack of "honesty in fact," and a party can act dishonestly
during many parts of the contractual relationship. For example, a
party who makes an intentional material misrepresentation during
negotiations probably exhibits bad faith. 1 6 Therefore, applying the
reasoning of the dissent in Farris, the court in Sherrodd could
have found that when defendant made an oral promise that it did
not intend to keep, there was a breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing even if the promise was not part of the
agreement.
V. APPLICATION OF THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
We have now completed the first two parts of the analysis. We
have asked:
" What evidence are you offering?
" For what purpose are you offering it?
114. Id. at 343-44, 838 P.2d at 380.
115. Sherrodd, 249 Mont. at 286, 815 P.2d at 1137.
116. See McGregor v. Mommer, 220 Mont. 98, 714 P.2d 536 (1986) (finding fraud in
negotiation). Although the court did not find the fraud to constitute bad faith, the issue was
the tort of bad faith and the standard was the now discarded Nicholson test. Id. at 108-09,
714 P.2d at 542-43 (citing Nicholson v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 219 Mont. 32, 710 P.2d 1342
(1985)).
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Having eliminated instances where the introduction of extrinsic
evidence does not invoke the parol evidence rule, let us now ex-
amine instances that do. The parol evidence rule applies when evi-
dence is offered for the purpose of showing that an extrinsic agree-
ment, usually oral, is part of the parties' agreement. When
analyzing a parol evidence question, it will be helpful to ask these
two questions:
" Was the oral agreement made?
* Was the oral agreement part of the parties' entire agreement?
Because a party who fails to prove that the oral agreement is part
of the parties' agreement often attempts to show that the oral
promise induced the agreement, it will also be helpful to ask
whether a party was defrauded.
A. Was the Oral Agreement Made?
When Party P alleges that an extrinsic agreement should be
admitted and enforced, P must prove that the answer to both
questions is YES: D made the agreement, and it was part of the
entire agreement. D will usually answer both questions NO: We
didn't make the oral agreement, and the writing represents the en-
tire agreement. In Sherrodd, for example, COP disputed Sher-
rodd's version of the facts, claiming that COP agreed to assist
Sherrodd in seeking additional compensation from the owner be-
cause of changed circumstances but that COP did not agree to pay
Sherrodd itself. COP also claimed that the writing represented the
entire agreement.'1 7 However, in the procedural posture of a mo-
tion for summary judgment or an appeal where the trial court has
made a finding of fact, a court must usually assume that the an-
swer to the first question is YES: The parties made the oral agree-
ment. This approach gives tremendous weight to the second ques-
tion, for if the answer to the second question is NO, then the
answer to the first question is moot: even if the oral agreement was
actually made, the parties did not intend it to be part of their
agreement. Therefore, the first question is frequently disregarded.
The first question is a classic fact question-your word against
mine. Law students always focus initially on this question, believ-
ing that parol evidence is a fact question rather than a law ques-
tion and that the most important issue is whether the agreement
was made. Like many intuitive responses, the mistaken notion of
the students reflects a great deal of common sense-if a party
117. Sherrodd, 249 Mont. at 284, 815 P.2d at 1136.
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made the promise, that fact ought to be given a lot of weight. For
if the parties made the oral agreement, then that fact suggests that
the writing does not contain their entire agreement and helps in
the process of finding their true agreement.
Consider an analogy to the statute of frauds, the statutes re-
quiring that certain agreements be evidenced by a writing. Courts
have generally construed these statutes narrowly in order to en-
force agreements parties clearly made but neglected to reduce to
writing. Consider two situations. In the first, P says to D, "Thanks
for agreeing to sell me your car for $5,000. I'm here to pick it up."
D expresses astonishment and denies any such agreement. If this
were merely a fact question, the chance of legal error might be
quite high, for if the trier of fact were to believe P and not D, then
D would be forced into a transaction D never in fact made. The
statute of frauds would come to D's aid, in effect requiring a higher
showing of proof by P, i.e., some memorialization of the
transaction.'1 8
In the second hypothetical, assume that when P comes to pick
up the car, D says, "Yes, I did make that agreement with you. But
ha ha, it is not enforceable because of the statute of frauds!" Is
there any reason D should be able to use this "technicality" to es-
cape a deal D in fact made? No, according to the U.C.C., which
enforces, as an exception to the statute of frauds, an oral agree-
ment that a party admits making.'" Under the U.C.C. statute of
frauds, then, the rule is not used formalistically to deny enforce-
ability to agreements. Rather, the rule has no application when the
agreement was actually made.
The analogy to the parol evidence rule breaks down at the
next step, for P must show not only that the agreement was made
but that it was intended to be part of the agreement. Nevertheless,
if a court finds that the oral agreement was in fact made, the focus
should reasonably shift to P's explanation for why the writing did
not include that agreement. This approach would have some im-
pact on the functions of the parol evidence rule. The perjury func-
tion is affected because more allegations would survive the motion
stage and juries would get to decide the question of fact of whether
the agreement was made. The efficiency function is compromised
118. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-201 (1993).
119. Section 30-2-201(3)(b) of the Montana Code provides that "[a] contract which
does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (1) but which is valid in other respects is
enforceable . . . if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading,
testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale was made." MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-
2-201(3)(b) (1993).
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because fewer cases could be dismissed on motion, since for pur-
poses of the motion a court assumes that the agreement was made.
The channeling function is the most seriously compromised, be-
cause parties would be less frequently penalized for failing to put
their agreements in writing. But these are not the proper functions
of the rule. By focusing on whether the agreement was actually
made, more agreements that were actually made would probably
be enforced. The proponent of the oral evidence, however, would
still have to answer the second question.
B. Was the Oral Agreement Part of the Parties' Entire
Agreement?
Assuming then, that the oral statement was made, the law
must now distinguish between those statements that the parties
regarded as "just talk" and those that they intended to be legally
operative as part of the contract. This is the key issue in parol
evidence-how to determine what the parties intended.
Samuel Williston made the answer to this question easy. The
last of the great formalists, Williston's views reflected the idea of a
contract as an airtight document, an idea that still lingers in Mon-
tana. He suggested that examination of the contract would deter-
mine whether the parties intended that the writing contain their
entire agreement. Parties often express that intention in a merger
clause, a boilerplate provision that states that the entire agreement
is found in the writing. According to Williston's first test, if the
writing contains a merger clause, that is the end of the story.12
But what limited storytelling that is! The mere fact that the writ-
ing says that is all there is does not mean it is true, any more than
the statement in a will that a person is of sound mind proves that
the person is not loony. 2' The rest of the story may show any
number of reasons why terms were omitted. The parties may have
omitted a term intentionally or inadvertently. In a contract of ad-
hesion, a party may not have known of the presence of the merger
clause. One party may have prevailed upon the other to omit a
term rather than mess up the neatly printed fabric of the agree-
ment. Because Williston's reliance on merger clauses proves too
much, a modern trend gives them less weight.' 22
To determine how much weight to give a merger clause, a
court must examine the clause itself and the circumstances of its
120. 4 SAMUEL WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 633 (3d ed. 1961).
121. I recall a cartoon in which the lawyer reading the will intones, "I, Emperor Duane
IV of Nebraska, being of sound mind .... "
122. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209 cmt. b (1981).
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inclusion in the contract. The inquiry should take two steps. First,
did the circumstances, including the writing itself, give clear notice
to the party alleging extrinsic evidence that oral representations
did not count and that the writing was the entire agreement? For
example, was the merger clause buried in boilerplate, was it com-
prehensive, and was the party's attention called to it? Second, how
sophisticated was the party in comprehending and processing the
notice? For example, if the party is a sophisticated business person
negotiating a complex transaction, then a boilerplate merger clause
should suffice. In fact, a merger clause may not be necessary to
show finality and completeness when sophisticated corporate par-
ties have hammered out a comprehensive agreement.123 On the
other hand, if the party is an unsophisticated individual signing a
contract of adhesion, then the strongest merger clause may not
prove that the agreement was merged in the writing.12
Under this approach to integration, a merger clause will have
weight, but a court will have to listen to a party's explanation of
why the agreement is not found entirely in the writing even though
the writing purports to be complete. As an example, consider a
personal guaranty given by an officer of a corporation to a lender, a
transaction that frequently raises parol evidence issues. 2' When
the lender seeks to enforce the contract, the guarantor may allege
that the lender made an oral representation; for example, that the
lender would look first to the principal debtor or would seek an
amount less than that stated in the guaranty. Examining this phe-
nomenon, one expert observed:
No one seems to know why guarantors, many of whom are sophis-
ticated business people, rely on representations at odds with the
terms of the written instrument. Nor does anyone seem to know
why lending officers make these representations, if in fact they
do. One explanation is that because guarantors are understanda-
bly reluctant to become liable for someone else's debt, lending of-
ficers try to persuade them by making promises they later regret.
The guarantors, for their part sign the document containing lan-
guage contrary to the agreement because they fail to read it care-
fully, fail to understand it, or rely on the assurances of the lend-
123. In ARB, Inc. v. E-Systems, Inc., 663 F.2d 189, 199-200 (D.C. Cir. 1980), the cir-
cuit court considered the agreement integrated because an additional term "would disrupt
the delicate balance, the harmony, that the written contract establishes among the 'respec-
tive obligations' of the parties."
124. One study found that many judges implicitly decide parol evidence cases in this
manner but express other reasons for the outcome. Robert Childres & Stephen J. Spitz,
Status in the Law of Contract, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1972).
125. ROBERT M. LLOYD, SECURED TRANSACTIONS 548-49 (1988).
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ing officer. Another explanation is that guarantors fabricate these
supposed agreements. Still another possibility is that guarantors
misinterpret (genuinely or disingenuously) statements of policy
("We normally do not call on the guarantor until the principal
debtor's assets are exhausted") as concrete agreements.'12
Courts frequently invoke the parol evidence rule to exclude testi-
mony of the lender's statements because the guaranty document
contains a merger clause. The reasoning behind exclusion appears
to emphasize the channeling function: With a strong parol evi-
dence rule, guarantors will know they must rely on the writing and
not on the oral representations. They will therefore tune out what
they hear and pay more attention to what they can read.'27
Consider on the other hand the functions that might be served
by a rule that would not honor the merger clause on its face but
would allow a guarantor to offer evidence of the facts and circum-
stances of the making of the agreement. If, after hearing this evi-
dence, a court determines that the agreement is not integrated and
admits the extrinsic evidence, presumably it may be believed by a
jury. In that event, lenders will learn that they had better keep
quiet, encourage the guarantors to read the document, and advise
the guarantors to consult with their attorneys if they have any
questions. This result seems more desirable. In balancing two pub-
lic policy interests-promoting the certainty of written agreements
and enforcing agreements that are actually made-the latter
should be given greater weight. One way to serve this policy is
through training of bank personnel. It could be said that this pol-
icy is already served by merger clauses, which in effect tell parties
exactly what bank personnel would tell them. But the fact is that a
merger clause is just one more item of boilerplate that parties do
not read, particularly when they are persuaded that it is not mean-
ingful. If the concept is important enough to communicate clearly
to the guarantor, the bank should put language in a conspicuous
place in the guaranty.2 8 Rare will be the judge who will admit the
126. Id. at 549.
127. See, e.g., Beverly Hills Nat'l Bank v. Glynn, 73 Cal. Rptr. 808 (Cal. Ct. App.
1968).
128. For example, one author has this suggestion for the contract of adhesion:
Ideally, for an integration clause to have any significant reliability in a purely ad-
hesion situation, the form would be more like "Write anything anyone said about
this sale which was important to you in the space that follows. Understand this: If
you haven't got it in writing, you haven't got it." And if the seller then instructed
the customer to write "nobody said anything" if nobody did, or "it's all here" if it
was, then that statement in that blank would be very persuasive on the point that
the contract was integrated.
CORBIN, supra note 18, § 578, at 530.
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evidence in the face of that warning.
A good example of conspicuous communication of the impor-
tance of the writing is the Federal Trade Commission Used Motor
Vehicle Trade Regulation Rule.129 Testimony before the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) indicated that used car dealers notori-
ously made false representations to buyers, particularly about the
extent of the seller's liability for post-sale problems. When the cus-
tomer complained about a problem after the sale, the seller would
point to language in the agreement, which first stated that there
are no warranties (often the words "AS IS" were used, which is
usually sufficient under the statute to disclaim all implied warran-
ties) and second stated a strong merger clause, indicating that the
writing represented the entire understanding of the parties. Armed
with this language, the seller would stand behind the parol evi-
dence rule.130
The FTC rule requires the seller to post a sticker on the car
that clearly indicates the warranty terms of the sale and that
warns the customer: "IMPORTANT: Spoken promises are difficult
to enforce. Ask the dealer to put all promises in writing."1"1 This
regulation represents the formalist paradigm for solving integra-
tion problems. The customer is clearly informed of the terms of
the deal, is warned in advance of the possible pitfalls, and is told
what he or she can do about it. Theoretically, customers should not
fall into any traps, and if they do, their story will not be
compelling." 2
Let us examine the merger clause in Sherrodd in its full con-
text. The court assumed for purposes of the pretrial motion that
the oral promise was made, but found that it was not part of the
contract because of the merger clause. The court neglected to point
out, however, that the subcontract between Sherrodd and COP did
not contain a merger clause. It contained an "Additional Provi-
sion" stating that "[t]he attached provisions of the agreement be-
129. 16 C.F.R. § 455 (1993).
130. See Scott J. Burnham, Remedies Available to the Purchaser of a Defective Used
Car, 47 MONT. L. REv. 273, 276-79 (1986).
131. 16 C.F.R. § 455.2 (1993).
132. But see Curtis v. Bill Byrd Automotive, Inc., 579 So. 2d 590 (Ala. 1990). In Cur-
tis, plaintiff claimed that he had been defrauded when he purchased a used car both by
affirmative statements and by silence when disclosure was required. Id. at 592. Defendant
raised compliance with the FTC Used Car Regulation in its defense. Id. at 593. The major-
ity admitted the parol evidence in spite of the disclosures. Id. at 592-94. The dissent found
that there could be no fraud when the customer had been clearly told that the writing repre-
sented the entire agreement and had been warned not to rely on the representations of the
seller and in fact had not relied on them but had conducted an independent investigation.
Id. at 594-95 (Maddox, J., dissenting).
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tween Cop Construction Co. and Schlekeway & Associates are
hereby made a part of this agreement between Cop Construction
Co. and Sherrodd, Inc." Buried in the "Standard Subcontract Pro-
visions" of the agreement between COP Construction Co. and
Schlekeway & Associates was the merger clause:
It is distinctly understood and agreed by Subcontractor that this
Subcontract is made for the consideration herein named, and that
the Subcontractor has, by examination, satisfied himself as to the
nature and location of the work, the character, quantity, and kind
of materials to be encountered, the character, kind and quantity
of equipment needed during the prosecution of the work, the lo-
cation, conditions and other matters which can in any manner af-
fect the work under this Subcontract. No verbal agreement with
any agent either before or after the execution of this Subcontract
shall affect or modify any of the terms or obligations herein con-
tained and this contract shall be conclusively considered as con-
taining and expressing all of the terms and conditions agreed
upon by the parties hereto. 3 '
Incorporation by reference is a well-accepted practice that
saves considerable time in drafting. A document or provision that
is incorporated by reference is as much a part of the original docu-
ment as if it had been expressly set forth in that document. The
technique is often used in the construction industry, where specifi-
cations in the contract between the owner and the general contrac-
tor may be incorporated by reference in contracts between the gen-
eral contractor and subcontractors. An issue that often arises,
however, is the scope of the incorporated document. In a leading
case, the United States Supreme Court stated that "in the case of
sub-contracts, as in other cases of express agreements in writing, a
reference by the contracting parties to an extraneous writing for a
particular purpose makes it a part of their agreement only for the
purpose specified.' 1 34
Did Sherrodd and COP intend to incorporate all the provi-
sions or only those relevant to their agreement? A number of cases
have held that only provisions concerning technical aspects of the
work are incorporated and not administrative clauses.135 As be-
tween COP and Schlekeway, the merger clause clearly states that
the writing is final and complete. But did the incorporated merger
clause serve the same function between Sherrodd and COP? Sher-
133. Appellant's Brief app., Sherrodd (No. 90-347).
134. Guerini Stone Co. v. P.J. Carlin Constr. Co., 240 U.S. 264, 277-78 (1916).
135. See T. Bart Gary, Incorporation by Reference and Flow-Down Clauses, CON-
STRUCTION LAW., Aug. 1990, at 1.
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rodd thought an enforceable promise was made to him. Did the
writing alert him to the fact that this promise did not count? Note
that in the merger clause, "this Subcontract" refers to the agree-
ment between COP and Schlekeway and "the Subcontractor" re-
fers to COP. It seems reasonable for the contract between Sher-
rodd and COP to incorporate by reference technical aspects of the
job, but not a merger clause that was personal to the original
parties. 13 e
Furthermore, courts are often sympathetic to consumers who
have good explanations for why they signed a writing that ex-
cluded an oral representation." 7 Although Sherrodd was techni-
cally not a consumer, his economic circumstances placed him, like
a consumer, in a very weak bargaining position. He had no oppor-
tunity to negotiate the agreement but had to sign what was offered
him. In fact, unlike most consumers, he could not simply walk
away from the deal. Considering all of these circumstances, the
merger clause should have been given little weight.
This is not to say that every time a court finds that there was
an oral agreement, it must find that that agreement is part of the
contract. There may be circumstances when, because of the nature
of the agreement or the effect on third parties, a writing should be
regarded as complete despite evidence of actual side agreements.
Williston's first test-whether there is a merger clause-may be
overly formalistic, but his second test is more functional. He asks if
the additional terms were such as might naturally be made and not
included in the writing by parties situated as were the parties to
the written contract.1 3 8 The written agreement is more likely re-
garded as complete if it is the function of the agreement to be
complete. A will is a clear example of an agreement intended to be
complete on its face. Estates law generally provides that terms
136. It seems especially unreasonable that the court excluded the extrinsic evidence of
fraud because that evidence directly contradicted the written terms when those terms were
so tenuously connected to the written contract. Sherrodd, 249 Mont. at 285, 815 P.2d at
1137. See infra text accompanying notes 151-66.
137. See Childres & Spitz, supra note 124. Their findings were confirmed by a study
of parol evidence decisions in Wisconsin. See Michael A. Lawrence, The Parol Evidence
Rule in Wisconsin: Status in the Law of Contract, Revisited, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 1071.
138. WILLISTON, supra note 120, § 638, at 1040-41. Williston states:
[T]he test of admissibility is much affected by the inherent probability of parties
who contract under the circumstances in question, simultaneously making both
the agreement in writing which is before the court, and also the alleged parol
agreement. The point is not merely whether the court is convinced that the par-
ties before it did in fact do this, but whether parties so situated generally would or
might do so.
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outside the writing are not admissible unless executed with the
proper formalities. '39 Other agreements may not be executed with
the same formalities, but may by their nature be intended as final
and complete. Examples include a recorded deed, a separation
agreement between husband and wife that concludes all aspects of
their relationship, and a carefully negotiated agreement between
two sophisticated businesses. In these circumstances, even if the
oral agreement was in fact made, the agreement might nevertheless
be regarded as complete without it.
The problem with Williston's tests is that they bear no rela-
tionship with reality. They are objective tests, looking at what rea-
sonable parties do or what probability shows most parties do.141
The tests do not look to the actual circumstances of the parties.
Hearing evidence of the actual circumstances would invite perjury
and would require juries to sort out the facts, all of which would
require court time, thus reducing judicial efficiency. For example,
courts frequently find the existence of an oral agreement but de-
termine that it is not part of the contract when the oral agreement
contradicts the written agreement. In that case, a court generally
assumes that the writing reflects the parties' final and complete
agreement as to the terms contained in the writing. Before summa-
rily determining that no oral agreement may be allowed to contra-
dict a writing, however, a court should look at the circumstances of
the parties and determine whether in fact the parties intended the
oral agreement to have greater weight than the writing. For exam-
ple, the company and the sales person may have intentionally mis-
stated the commission term in the writing.14 1
If a court gives too much weight to the writing, it ignores the
fact that the writing never reflects the parties' final and complete
agreement. 142 The agreement is supplemented by so many
things-gap fillers, default rules, course of performance, course of
dealing, usage of trade, interpretation-that we must ask, why not
supplement it with oral understandings as well? For example, a
buyer contracts to buy goods for a price of $100,000. The seller
delivers and demands $120,000. The buyer insists on adherence to
the written agreement. The seller offers evidence of custom and
139. MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-522 (1993). This rule has been considerably relaxed, re-
flecting the reality that people often make less formal agreements. See MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 72-2-523 (1993).
140. Similarly, default rules applied in areas of the parties' non-agreement are criti-
cized for failing to carry out the parties' actual intentions. See Lawrence Kalevitch, Gaps in
Contracts: A Critique of Consent Theory, 54 MONT. L. REV. 169 (1993).
141. See supra text accompanying note 85.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 32-61.
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usage in the trade under which increases in the seller's cost of do-
ing business can be passed on to the buyer. This evidence is, by
statute, allowed to supplement even the terms of the parties' inte-
grated written agreement. 43 Because parties in the trade are pre-
sumed to bargain in the context of that trade, trade practices are
assumed incorporated unless specifically excluded.14 4 Should the
result be any different if the seller alleged not a trade custom, but
an oral understanding between the parties that increases in cost
could be passed on to the buyer?
One circumstance that must be considered is the effect of the
oral understanding on third parties.145 It is sometimes asked
whether the parol evidence rule "applies" to third parties. As
framed, the question is absurd. Because the purpose of the rule is
to help find the contract, it can also be used to find the obligations
of the third party. For example, assume the third party is Surety S
who executes a performance bond with Contractor C for the bene-
fit of Owner 0. The written contract between C and 0 states that
C will do job X, but the parties entered into a side agreement stat-
ing that C will also do Y for the same consideration. C defaults and
O seeks performance from S. Is S's obligation to perform X only or
X plus Y?
The first step is to find the contract between C and 0 by ask-
ing the two questions:
" Was the oral agreement made?
" Was the oral agreement part of the parties' entire agreement?
If the answer is that the writing represents an integration of the
agreement, that is the end of the inquiry, for then the contract is
for X only. If the answer is that the agreement is not integrated,
then the contract between C and 0 is for X plus Y. Is term Y
binding on S? For that purpose, it is necessary to find the contract
between C and S (or at least the promise of which 0 claims to be
the beneficiary). Again, start with the two questions. If the agree-
ment between C and S is found only in a writing that binds S to
perform C's obligations in the written agreement between C and 0,
then S is bound only by X. But if the agreement between C and S
discloses the oral agreement and the scope of S's performance in-
cluded Y, then S is bound to perform both X and Y.
143. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-202 (1993) at text accompanying supra note 50.
144. See, e.g., Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir.
1981).
145. See Note, The Parol Evidence Rule and Third Parties, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 945
(1973).
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Application of the rule to a third party might also arise in the
event of assignment and delegation. For example, in the above hy-
pothetical involving the purchase of goods for $100,000, assume
that the first buyer assigned its right to receive the goods and dele-
gated its duty to pay for them to a second buyer. If the seller de-
manded an additional $20,000 from the second buyer, the second
buyer would be bound if the obligation arose by custom and usage
in the trade, but would not be bound by an oral understanding
between the original parties of which it had no notice.
In Baker v. Bailey,'46 the court refused to enforce an oral
agreement that was actually made because of the nature of the
agreement and its effect on third parties. Mr. and Mrs. Bailey lived
in a mobile home on land owned by their daughter and son-in-law,
who also had a home on the property that obtained water from a
well. The daughter and son-in-law installed a pipeline from their
water line to the mobile home. Six years later, the daughter and
son-in-law conveyed one acre on which the mobile home was lo-
cated to the Baileys and the remaining forty-five acres to the Bak-
ers. At this time, the Baileys and the Bakers entered into a written
Water Well Use Agreement to assure the Baileys access to the
water now located on the Bakers' land.1 47
The agreement provided that the right to use the water ex-
tended only to the Baileys. If the Baileys sold their property, the
Bakers had no obligation to provide the new owners with water.
The Bakers also received a right of first refusal in the event of a
sale by the Baileys. Two years after execution of the agreement,
the Baileys decided to sell the land at an asking price of $47,500.
The Bakers then informed the Baileys that they would not make
water available to any purchasers. When the Baileys received an
offer of $8,000 for the land without water, the Bakers exercised the
right of first refusal, purchasing the land for $8000.'14
When the Bakers sued to recover unpaid expenses, the Baileys
counterclaimed, alleging breach of the agreement. 149 At trial, the
Baileys offered evidence of oral understandings between the par-
ties. They testified that because the Bakers were concerned that
the future owners of the Bailey property might be undesirable, the
parties orally agreed that the Bakers would transfer the water
rights to a reasonable purchaser of the property. 150 The writing,
146. 240 Mont. 139, 782 P.2d 1286 (1989).
147. Baker, 240 Mont. at 141, 782 P.2d at 1287.
148. Id. at 141-42, 782 P.2d at 1287.
149. Id. at 142, 782 P.2d at 1288.
150. Id. at 143, 782 P.2d at 1288.
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however, stated that the right was personal to the Baileys.15 1
If the oral agreement in Baker were enforceable, there would
be increasingly complex questions about what it meant. Was the
agreement personal to the Bakers or did it run with the land? That
is, if the Baileys sold to a purchaser approved by the Bakers,
would those purchasers have to obtain approval from the Bak-
ers-or from their successors-when they sold? If so, where would
a seller or purchaser find notice of this restriction? The parties
could testify to these intentions, but ultimately many points were
not decided. An advantage of writing things down is that parties
not only memorialize their understandings, they work out details.
In Baker, the problem was not just that the agreement was oral,
but that it was indefinite.152 Because of these factors-the convey-
ance-like nature of this agreement, the effect on third parties, and
the need for details-the court properly determined that the par-
ties should have reduced their understanding to writing.
The Sherrodd court may have been persuaded to invoke the
parol evidence rule by the commercial nature of the agreement and
the need for third parties to rely on the writing, for the majority
noted that COP's bid included Sherrodd's bid. 153 The court, how-
ever, may have overlooked the sequence of events. Because COP's
bid was submitted before the agreement was written down, COP
could not have been relying on the written agreement but must
have relied on the oral understandings. Safeco, the surety which
provided COP's payment bond, represents the kind of third party
against whofm the parol evidence should not be admitted. Because
it lacked knowledge of the oral agreement, Safeco's liability should
be limited to the $97,500 expressed in the written agreement. If
Sherrodd expected Safeco's obligation to be enlarged, then it was
Sherrodd's responsibility to get that obligation in writing; Sher-
rodd had no such obligation to COP, which knew about the oral
understanding.
The modern view of the integration doctrine, as advocated by
151. Id.
152. The role of negotiations in the application of the rule indicates why careful law-
yers always save prior drafts of documents. The extrinsic evidence (in the case of prior
drafts not oral evidence) may serve a function analogous to "legislative history," proving
how a particular term came to be included in the private agreement. In Baker, the Bakers
pointed out in their reply brief that in an initial draft, the Well Use Agreement ran with the
land but that in the executed draft the benefit was personal to the Baileys. Appellant's
Reply Brief at 5-6, Baker (No. 89-260). This change indicates that the earlier understanding
was supplanted. Id. (appending the unexecuted draft as Exhibit 1); see also Depositors
Trust Co. v. Hudson Gen. Corp., 485 F. Supp. 1355 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (reviewing prior docu-
ments to ascertain the parties' intentions).
153. Sherrodd, 249 Mont. at 284, 815 P.2d at 1136.
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Corbin 5' and reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts,1 55 requires not just examination of the document but an ex-
amination of all the facts and circumstances to determine whether
the parties intended the writing to represent their final and com-
plete agreement. However, even if a court determines that the
writing is fully integrated, the evidence may still be admissible. A
party may present the extrinsic evidence not to supplement the
agreement, but to prove lack of assent. Let us now explore this
exception to the parol evidence rule.
VI. THE FRAUD EXCEPTION
When Party P alleges that D promised X, P has two bites at
the apple. First, P can offer to prove that the oral understanding is
part of the totality of the parties' agreement by showing that the
writing does not represent the entire understanding of the parties.
To parry this attack, D interposes the parol evidence rule. If P is
unsuccessful on this ground, P can offer to prove that he or she
was induced to enter the agreement by fraud. This offer of proof
does not invoke the parol evidence rule because the oral under-
standing is offered not to prove that it was part of the contract but
to prove that no contract was formed because of lack of assent.156
In theory the merger clause is no defense to this claim, for Party P
alleges that the entire contract-including the merger clause-is
not effective.
Consider the remedial effect of this claim. If P is successful in
showing that no contract was formed, the remedy is to restore both
parties to their pre-contractual positions. 157 P is not able to enforce
the oral promise as part of the contract, so P will not receive ex-
pectancy damages. However, to return the parties to their pre-con-
tractual positions, the court may award either party damages in
reliance or restitution. These equitable remedies may be very simi-
lar to contract damages. For example, assume that the Sherrodd
court had determined that no contract was formed because of the
fraud. To restore the parties to their original positions, the court
would have had to recognize the fact that Sherrodd conferred a
substantial benefit on COP by moving the additional earth. In res-
titution, the court would have awarded Sherrodd the reasonable
154. CORBIN, supra note 18, § 582.
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209 (1981).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 90-96; see also Justin Sweet, Promissory
Fraud and the Parol Evidence Rule, 49 CAL. L. REV. 877 (1961).
157. See Scott J. Burnham, Contract Damages in Montana Part II: Reliance and Res-
titution, 45 MONT. L. REV. 1, 10-12 (1984).
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value of the services, which would probably be measured at $3.90
per cubic yard, the same as the contract price. Therefore, although
parties alleging lack of assent and parties alleging extrinsic agree-
ments have different theories of the case, the remedial results may
not differ.
Fraud takes two basic forms: a misrepresentation of an ex-
isting fact and a promise made without intent to render the per-
formance.15 The latter is often referred to as promissory fraud. If
every false promise were considered a fraudulent promise, then in-
deed the fraud exception would swallow up the parol evidence rule.
Party P can claim, "You orally promised me X and you did not
perform. I am offering this proof not for the purpose of showing
that X is part of the contract, but for the purpose of showing that
your promise of X induced me to enter the contract." Troubled by
the expansiveness of the fraud exception to the parol evidence
rule, the Montana court has tried to contain it.
To explore these containment efforts, it may be helpful to be-
gin with the elements of fraud, as consistently stated by Montana
courts:
In order to establish a prima facie case of actual fraud it is
well settled that the party seeking to avoid the contract must
prove: "(1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4)
the speaker's knowledge of its falsity, or ignorance of its truth; (5)
his intent that it should be acted upon by the person and in the
manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer's ignorance of its
falsity; (7) his reliance upon its truth; (8) his right to rely thereon;
(9) and his consequent and proximate injury." The final determi-
nation of whether there was actual fraud is always a question of
fact.1 59
In one approach to limiting parol evidence, the court has focused
on the state of mind of the deceiver as stated in elements (4) and
(5): P must show evidence of an intent to defraud at the time the
promise was made. 160 P .may easily prove this element with a
fraudulent misrepresentation, for the fact that the present misrep-
resentation is at odds with existing fact is a strong indication of
intent to defraud. But with promissory fraud, the fact that the
speaker did not keep the promise in the future does not necessarily
158. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-712 (1993).
159. United States v. Willard E. Fraser Co., 308 F. Supp. 557, 569 (D. Mont. 1970),
aff'd, 459 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1972) (citations ommitted); see also Bails v. Gar, 171 Mont. 343,
346, 558 P.2d 458, 461 (1976).
160. See, e.g., Dew v. Dower, 258 Mont. 114, 852 P.2d 549 (1993); Dew v. Dower, 237
Mont. 476, 774 P.2d 989 (1989); Dodds v. Gibson Prods. Co., 181 Mont. 373, 593 P.2d 1022
(1979); Goggans v. Winkley, 159 Mont. 85, 495 P.2d 594 (1972).
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prove the speaker's intent to defraud at the time the promise was
made; if it did, all breach of contract claims would be fraud claims.
For example, in Dew v. Dower,' plaintiffs, purchasers of real es-
tate, entered into written contracts for deed with defendant seller.
When plaintiffs claimed that defendant orally promised them im-
proved access roads and then did not construct the roads, defend-
ant invoked the parol evidence rule. 162 The trial court allowed the
evidence under the fraud exception.'63 On appeal, defendant ar-
gued that plaintiffs had not proven intent to defraud at the time
the contracts were made. Referring to photographs that defendant
showed plaintiffs at the time of contracting, the court observed:
According to [defendant], the photographs accurately reflect the
improvements she intended when she promised the plaintiffs im-
proved roads. If, as [defendant] testified, the rough-graded dirt
roads in the photographs depict the roads that she intended when
she promised county-grade roads, then it is clear that the District
Court could find she had no intention of performing her promises
when she told the plaintiffs she would construct county-grade
roads.'6
Distinguishing the facts from Sherrodd, the court held that the pa-
rol evidence was properly admitted because it did not contradict
the written contract.165
The more common approach the court uses to limit parol evi-
dence focuses on the state of mind of the deceived as stated in
elements (7) and (8): P must prove not only that P relied on the
false promise, but that it was reasonable for P to do so. When P
offers parol evidence of promise X, the court is troubled when it
finds the subject of the oral promise addressed in the writing. The
court in effect asks P, "If X was so important to you that it in-
duced you to enter the contract, then why was it not important
enough for you to see that it was included in the writing?" Under
Williston's approach, the writing would tell the whole story.' 6" But
P always has a story to tell in answer to that question, and the
outcome of a case involving the fraud exception usually turns on
the quality of P's storytelling.
In Sherrodd, the majority turned a deaf ear to plaintiff's story
because the contract directly addressed the subject matter of the
161. Dew, 258 Mont. 114, 852 P.2d 549 (1993).
162. Id. at 110, 852 P.2d at 552.
163. Id. at 120, 852 P.2d at 552-53.
164. Id. at 122, 852 P.2d at 553.
165. Id. at 120, 852 P.2d at 552.
166. See supra text accompanying note 120.
1994]
43
Burnham: The Parol Evidence Rule
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1994
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
fraud-the quantity of earth to be moved:
Here, any reliance on the alleged fraudulent statement of the
Morrison-Knudsen representative is contradicted by the terms of
the written contract that Sherrodd has, "by examination, satisfied
himself as to the ... character, quantity and kind of materials to
be encountered." The contention that the $97,500 covered only
25,000 cubic yards of earthwork contradicts the terms of the writ-
ten agreement that all "negotiations and agreements" prior to the
date of the contract are merged in the writing and that the work
to be done is "lump sum." We conclude that the parol evidence
rule applies.'
Justice Trieweiler in his dissent found that all the elements of
fraud were satisfied.' He would have repudiated the Montana
precedents that limit the fraud exception to the parol evidence
rule. Moreover, he pointed out that the limitation of the fraud ex-
ception would encourage fraudulent conduct: "Based on this deci-
sion, and our previous decision in Continental Oil, all that a fraud-
ulent party needs to do in order to avoid accountability for
fraudulent conduct is to obtain the signature of his defrauded vic-
tim on a written agreement 0 9
The dissent in Sherrodd echoes a long line of cases that advo-
cate a more sympathetic view of the fraud allegation.17 0 Those
cases recognize that a party claiming fraud often had no choice but
to sign the agreement that contradicted the oral understanding.
Therefore, the mere fact that the alleged representations contra-
dict the language of the contract should not be sufficient to bar P
from explaining the circumstances. The tactics of defrauders are
numerous, as a New York judge observed:
'[Tihe ingenuity of draftsmen is sure to keep pace with the de-
mands of wrongdoers, and if a deliberate fraud may be shielded
by a clause in a contract that the writing contains every represen-
tation made by way of inducement, or that utterances shown to
be untrue were not an inducement to the agreement,' a fraudu-
lent seller would have a simple method of obtaining immunity for
his misconduct.17 '
167. Sherrodd, 249 Mont. at 285, 815 P.2d at 1137.
168. Id. at 287-89, 815 P.2d at 1138-39.
169. Id. at 289, 815 P.2d at 1139.
170. "Even a clause specifically reciting that there have been no representations of a
particular kind should be ineffective as against extrinsic evidence to show fraud, although
there is some authority to the contrary." FARNSWORTH, supra note 24, § 7.4, at 484 (foot-
notes omitted).
171. Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 157 N.E.2d 597, 602 (N.Y. 1959) (Fuld, J., dis-
senting) (quoting Judge Augustus Hand in Arnold v. National Aniline & Chem. Co., 20 F.2d
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It is curious that the Montana court found Sherrodd's story
less sympathetic than that told by the plaintiff in Jenkins v. Hil-
lard,72 which did persuade the court of fraud. Jenkins, the pur-
chaser of a hotel, alleged that the seller had made fraudulent rep-
resentations about the heating system.173 The court was troubled
by the fact that the written sales agreement directly addressed the
issue of representation in the following provisions:
"Buyer has inspected and is familiar with the premises and
the physical condition of all the furniture, fixtures and equipment
and improvements thereon and therein, and enters into this
Agreement on his own independent investigation."
and
"This contract contains the entire agreement between the
parties and the Buyer affirms that neither Seller nor any agent of
the Seller has made any representations or promises with respect
to or affecting the property herein described on this contract not
expressly contained herein and that Buyer affirms that he relies
upon his own personal observation and examination of the prop-
erty herein described.
1 7 4
The trial court granted summary judgment on the grounds that
the buyer had no right to rely on the representations. On appeal,
because of the procedural posture of the case, the court assumed
that Jenkins' allegations were true. 175 Reversing, the court found
that a fraud claim was made out because Jenkins did not know the
representation was false and could not easily find out whether it
was false. 7 The court paid little attention to the writing, stating:
[T]his Court has recognized the rule that "fraud vitiates every
transaction and all contracts." Bails v. Gar (1976), 171 Mont. 342,
558 P.2d 458, 461. The reasoning behind this rule is that a party
who has perpetrated fraud by inducing another to enter into a
contract may not then use the contract to immunize himself from
the fraud. Bails, 558 P.2d at 461-462. The contract provision
therefore does not preclude proof that a prior oral representation
was made and relied upon."'
Dissenting, Justice Sheehy would have given much greater weight
to the writing. He stated:
364, 369 (2d Cir. 1927)).
172. 199 Mont. 1, 647 P.2d 354 (1982).
173. Jenkins, 199 Mont. at 4, 647 P.2d at 356.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 4-5, 647 P.2d at 356.
176. Id. at 7-8, 647 P.2d at 357-58.
177. Id. at 5-6, 647 P.2d at 357.
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Here the buyer specifically contracted that the seller made
no representations to him not contained in the written agreement.
If that language affords no protection to a seller under these
facts, we have provided a fertile breeding ground for lawsuits in
all land sale contracts. There would be civic and social benefit if
we required persons signing written contracts to say what they
mean or mean what they say in the language used.7 8
Why was Justice Sheehy's plea heard in Sherrodd? The bar-
gaining power of the defrauded parties-their ability to insist on a
change in the writing-appears to be the most important factor in
the story they tell. Jenkins, like Sherrodd, presumably knew that
the oral representation contradicted the writing; unlike Sherrodd,
however, Jenkins was in a better position to do something about it.
The court did not explicitly analyze this factor in Jenkins or Sher-
rodd, but a federal judge did in another fraud case, United States
v. Willard E. Fraser Co.'79 Willard E. Fraser personally guaranteed
a note secured by a mortgage on a building in Billings in which the
federal government leased office space. 80 When entering the leases,
both parties anticipated that the government would continue to
lease the premises for the duration of the mortgage, which was
shorter than the term of the written lease. The government then
constructed a new federal building in Billings and vacated the old
building at the conclusion of the leases. In the foreclosure action,
Fraser offered evidence of these representations by the govern-
ment.' 8 ' Judge Jameson invoked the parol evidence rule to bar the
statements."8 2
In a curious postscript, Judge Jameson admitted that he was
not unsympathetic to Fraser's story:
There can be little question that both Fraser and the Gov-
ernment representatives who negotiated the last lease in 1958
were of the opinion that the lease would continue until the loan
was paid. While Fraser could not rely upon that assumption in
view of the written lease and loan agreements, it would seem
proper for the Government to give consideration to the oral rep-
resentations and assurances in negotiating an equitable settle-
ment with Fraser.'83
178. Id. at 8, 647 P.2d at 358.
179. 308 F. Supp. 557 (D. Mont. 1970), aff'd, 459 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1972).
180. Willard E. Fraser, 308 F. Supp. at 559; see discussion of guaranties, supra text
accompanying notes 125-28.
181. Willard E. Fraser, 308 F. Supp. at 560-61.
182. Id. at 565.
183. Id. at 566.
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This postscript clearly resolves the fact question. As suggested in
an earlier part of this Article, the fact that the agreement was
made indicates that it was part of the agreement. The burden is
then on P to explain why it was not included in the writing. 18
Judge Jameson found that the agreement was in fact made. Al-
though sympathetic to Fraser, he nevertheless felt that his hands
were tied. The judge could have manipulated the rule to find a
non-integrated agreement and enforced the oral understanding.
Should he have?
To put it more bluntly, should courts decide some issues with
their hearts instead of the cold logic of their heads? In this con-
text, yes! In deciding whether reliance is reasonable, a court must
put itself in the position of the victim of the fraud, trying to deter-
mine whether a reasonable person in those circumstances would
have swallowed the representation. That process requires empathy,
a legitimate factor in the rule of law. '
When will a judge be persuaded by the party's story? Judge
Jameson appended to the opinion in Willard E. Fraser the deci-
sion in an unreported case." 6 In that case he indicated that a judge
is less likely to be sympathetic when the testimony is offered by a
sophisticated businessperson.1 8 7 The facts represent a classic parol
evidence situation. Prior to entering the agreement, Roth, an agent
of defendants, made a number of promises and representations to
the partners of plaintiff. The partners examined the written agree-
ment and found that the promises were not contained in the writ-
ing. Roth assured them that the absence "didn't mean a thing"
and that defendant could be counted on to perform as promised.
When plaintiffs complained that defendant did not perform as
promised by Roth, defendant invoked the parol evidence rule,
pointing out that the promises did not appear in the written agree-
ment. The partners claimed fraud. Judge Jameson found that all of
the elements of fraud were present except one-the right to rely on
the false promise or representation. The judge concluded that the
partners should not have relied on Roth's statements but should
have shown better judgment, including seeking legal counsel.18 8 He
stated:
As noted supra, all of the C.M.C. partners were mature men, with
184. See supra text accompanying notes 117-19.
185. See Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987).
186. C.M.C. Constr. Co. v. Electronics & Missile Facilities, Inc., No. 65-2356 (D. Mont.
Dec. 15, 1965), cited in Willard E. Fraser, 308 F. Supp. at 566.
187. Willard E. Fraser, 308 F. Supp. at 570.
188. Id.
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a high school education and prior business experience, even
though they had not had prior experience in bidding on a govern-
ment project. They read the proposed contract and specifically
protested the absence of all of the oral promises and representa-
tions upon which they now rely in support of their contention of
fraud."' 9
It can be inferred from Judge Jameson's observations that a court
is more likely to find fraud when the injured party is less sophisti-
cated and has little opportunity to read and consider the contract.
These factors are often present in a consumer claim or in a case
similar to a consumer claim, such as Sherrodd's. 1 0 .
Perhaps the court in Sherrodd heard Justice Sheehy's plea
that parties should "say what they mean or mean what they say ' "
because of the commercial nature of the transaction. Although the
majority justified the result in Sherrodd as furthering commercial
stability, the fraud rule as enunciated in Sherrodd is probably
inefficient from an economic point of view. The goal of commercial
stability is served when courts enforce contracts by preventing one
party from defeating the other's legitimate expectations. An impor-
tant aspect of the enforcement process is to eliminate fraud.
Courts frequently distrust testimony of oral understandings, for a
party may easily invent a story. A "strong" parol evidence rule pre-
vents a party from introducing evidence or oral understandings
and thereby eliminates this species of fraud. But use of the rule to
control fraud may come at too high a price. It may well be that the
story is true, and the contract a court is asked to enforce includes
the oral understandings. If the story is not heard, the rule may be
used to perpetrate a fraud.
A party could more easily establish fraud if courts did not
weaken the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule by admitting
evidence only of terms that were not addressed in the contract. In
Sherrodd, the court seems to have refused to enforce an agreement
it knows the parties made because parties sometimes allege agree-
ments they did not make. Would it not make more sense for the
court to assume for purposes of summary judgment that the repre-
sentation was made and leave it up to the finder of fact to deter-
mine whether in the circumstances the hearer reasonably relied on
the representation. If perjured testimony is believed, some real
transactions may be nullified, but because more real promises will
be honored, the net result will be the elimination of more fraud.
189. Id.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 129-37.
191. Jenkins, 199 Mont. at 8, 647 P.2d at 358.
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The economic justification for this relaxation in the standard of
proof in order to reduce fraud is stated by a leading economist:
It may well be that the relaxation of the standard of proof re-
quired to make out any defense will increase the number of in-
stances where the undeserving [party] is able to defeat the [other
party's] legitimate contractual expectations. But if the costs
thereby created are low, then the change in the rules of proof is
justified on the grounds that it reduces the total error in enforce-
ment, even though all error is not thereby eliminated. 192
VII. CONCLUSION
I often think it's comical
How nature always does contrive
That every boy and every gal,
That's born into the world alive,
Is either a little Liberal,
Or else a little Conservative!'9"
It may be that just as Gilbert and Sullivan recognized that
every person is born to be either a conservative or a liberal, so is
everyone born to be either for excluding parol evidence or admit-
ting it. As Stanley Fish said of interpretation: "[W]henever there is
a dispute about the plain meaning of a contract, at some level the
dispute is between two (or more) visions of what life is or should
be like."' 94 It appears that the parol evidence rule is ultimately a
political choice in the broadest sense. 195
In one view of the world, things should function tidily. People
should think before they act, seek advice when out of their depth,
know what they are getting into, read all documents, and write
down all their agreements. If they do not, the law will see that they
suffer the consequences. People may be hurt, but they-and others
who learn of their misfortune-will profit from the experience, and
the world will become tidier. The drawback of this approach is
that it fails to recognize the human side of the law, the need for
fairness. If we expect formality every time, there is no humanity.
192. Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. LAW &
EcON. 293, 302 (1975).
193. W.S. GILBERT & ARTHUR SULLIVAN, IOLANTHE act 2.
194. Stanley Fish, The Law Wishes to Have a Formal Existence, in THE FATE OF LAW
159, 175 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1991).
195. Even in the narrow sense, it is no coincidence that Chief Justice Turnage and
Associate Justice Trieweiler squared off in an election shortly after the decision in Sherrodd
and that Sherrodd was cited during the campaign as representing the kind of choice the two
candidates offered. Turnage won, barely.
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In the other view of the world, people screw up. They grope
their way through a complex and demanding world, doing the best
they can, which is often not good enough, and they fall into traps.
When they do so, the law will examine the route they followed and
the nature of the particular trap. If the particular story is compel-
ling enough, they will be rescued. Whether others will also be res-
cued cannot be predicted-it is a function of how compelling their
story is. The drawback of this approach is that it fails to recognize
the stable side of the law, the need for predictability. If we look to
context every time, there is no rule of law.
Although the outcome of a parol evidence issue is difficult to
predict, two propositions can be tentatively offered. First, the oral
promise will not be enforced if the parties entered into a negoti-
ated agreement with a well-drafted merger clause. These are the
agreements made tidily, usually by sophisticated parties often with
the presence of lawyers. Second, the oral promise will be enforced
if a court thinks it was made and there are no good reasons why it
should not be enforced. These are the agreements made sloppily,
often by a consumer lacking bargaining power or by unsophistica-
ted parties who do not think through all the issues. 19 6 In this situa-
tion, a court's function is not unlike that of the clowns who roam
the rodeo ring with shovel and bucket. Principled reasons are ad-
duced for and against cleaning up the messes of others, which is
what makes a case like Sherrodd so difficult. There are "costs" as-
sociated with hearing evidence beyond that found in the writing.
One such cost is the judicial resources that are required to fully
hear a case. Another is the cost of erroneous decision-making
should false testimony be heard. Another cost, important in the
business world, is the expectation that third parties may rely on
the apparent completeness of documents.
On the other hand, there is a cost when a writing is enforced
that does not express the agreement of the parties, and that cost is
harder to measure. Undoubtedly more erroneous decision-making
results when courts bar evidence of agreements parties actually
made than results when courts admit evidence that might be
tainted by false testimony. It might be said that the cost of barring
the evidence is in fact an investment, an inducement to parties to
get the entire agreement in writing. This result would be ideal, but
196. In Baldwin v. Stuber, the court had to clean up quite a mess when the parties
began their agreement by stating: "On this date 3-8-77, I, Terry L. Baldwin, here-to-fore
known as sellor, and Alan D. Stuber, here-to-fore known as sellee, enter into a selling agree-
ment, which is here-to-fore known as The Natural Look Barber Salon," and the agreement
went downhill from there. 182 Mont. 501, 503, 597 P.2d 1135, 1136 (1979).
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it is questionable whether that ideal can be attained in the real
world.
Attorneys have an opportunity to help reach that ideal. They
can practice preventive law by remembering the parol evidence
rule not when they write their appellate briefs, but when they
draft their contracts. Before the agreement is signed, they should
ask themselves and their clients these questions:
* Does this writing contain the final and complete statement of
the agreement?
- How can I protect my client against a later offer of parol evi-
dence to supplement or contradict the agreement?
* What customs and usages of trade may be assumed to be part of
the parties' agreement?
Even with these efforts, the ideal is rarely achieved. Mere mortals
make contracts. They may make them orally, even sloppily, but
they are entitled to have the agreement they made carried out. It
is my hope that this Article presents some guidance for attorneys
and courts to better achieve that goal.
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